

d. 31
DE CAUSA DEI:
OR, A
VINDICATION
Of the Common
Doctrine of Protestant DIVINES,
Concerning
Predetermination:

(i. e.

The Interest of God as the first Cause,
in all the Actions, as such, of all Ra-
tional Creatures :)

From the invidious Consequences
with which it is burdened by

Mr. JOHN HOWE,

In a late Letter and Postscript, of
GOD'S PRESCIENCE.

By T. D.

L O N D O N,

Printed for *Tho. Cockerill*, at the *Three Legs*
in the *Poultry*, over against the
Stocks Market, 1678.

DE CASUS ADE
O.R.A
VINDICATION
Of the Opinion
Of the Province of Protestant Divines
Concerning
Predestination:

The Image of God as the first Cause;
in all the Actions, as such, of all Ra-
tional Creatures;
From the invidious Consequences
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Mr. JOHN HOWE
In a late Letter and Postscript, of
GOD'S PROVIDENCE.

By T. D.

L O N D O N

Printed for Tho. Cookwell, at the Three Legs
in the Strand, over against the
Stock Exchange, 1788.

To the Reverend Mr. JOHN HOWE,
Author of the late Letter and Post-
script of God's Prescience.

S I R,

WHen I had read the Title-page of
your late Letter to the Honoura-
ble Mr. Boyle; and thereby un-
derstood its design, and withal ob-
served the smallness of the Bulk, I promised
my self that it would be Pagella, hoc solo
nomine redarguenda, quod sit tota Gemmea.
For else I thought it would not be worthy of so
great a Mæcenas, a Master of all sorts of
Learning; and [so] whose nobility is not on-
ly in Parchment, (as Chatron speaks) : nor
of the Author, (for I was aware of him, though
he had concealed his name) whose parts I well
knew (and have always had the candor upon
all fit occasions to acknowledge) were not of
the lower size: nor yet of so excellent a sub-
ject, and so needful in these drags of time,
which urge so much toward Socinianism. And
in the perusal of the Letter it self, for some
time I pleased my self with an apprehension
that I had not imposed upon my self; nor had
my affection to the Author seduced my judg-
ment. Fancy and Reason were in so happy a

comparison, that I hoped they would never be parted thoroughout the whole Discourse. But alas! too soon I found my hopes shamefully baffled. For (beside a corrupt gloss upon Act. 4. 28. pag. 28. which I could not digest, and divers passages in the process of your after Discourse not unexceptionable) from pag. 32, to 50, to speak my sense freely, I found pro thesauro carbones, i.e. Coals instead of Treasure, shining indeed, but black and smutty; politeness of stile, I mean, continued, but the series of well-digested thoughts broken and dis-severed; jejune Answers to Arguments full of sense; old Popish Arguments dressed up A-la-mode, and many of which militate as much against your assertions as ours; and a great deal of good eloquence put to a very ill use, and a far worse than it would be to play at Duck and Drake with broad pieces in the Thames; and sometimes degenerate eloquence, which (like painted glass) though it was an ornament, yet impeded the transmission of the light: and (which is worst of all) the whole design of those Pages I found to be an averment of the old Popish Calumny, that by the Protestant Doctrine God is made the Author of sin; which I must needs profess was a strange surprisal to me; and so much the more, because I could not conceive what should induce you a Protestant Divine, to make affidavit of a Pontifical accusation, nor why in this Discourse. For of the end you assigned your self in doing

it was the vindication of the blessed God from
the imputation of being the cause of moral
evil, you have certainly furtht the Reader of
his expectation, by offering nothing toward it
but what he can easily see through, (viz.) that
God is not the cause [universally] of natural
good; or at least as remote as the Grand-fa-
ther is of the Grand-child. [See your own
words, Let. p. 36.] Two causes which might
seem probable of your doing it in this Discourse,
your self has removed out of your Readers way.
It was not the request of the Honourable Per-
son to whom your Letter is directed, but (for
ought I can collect) as the defending God's
Predeterminative concurrence unto sinful acti-
ons was an unenjoined task, Let. p. 150. So
was the overthrowing it too. Nor was it the
connexion between Prescience and Predetermi-
nation (as it lies in the Divine Decree, and is
the only true ground of the certainty of Divine
Prescience) for that was not your design to
demonstrate Gods Prescience of all whatso-
ever futurities, and consequently of the sins
of men; but supposing it to shew its recon-
cileableness with what it seemed not so well
to agree, (as you since tell us) Postle. p. 4.
which I did easily apprehend before. For all the
mediums you use for the eviction of this recon-
cileableness, borrow no strength from the deni-
al of Predetermination. Sometime after your
Letter succeeded a Postscript, in the view of
which I was more astonished than before: ob-

stipui steteruntque comae. For whereas I might have hoped that your second thoughts would be better, they proved a great deal worse. I had such an opinion of your modesty, that at least you would recall the hard words you gave the Arguments urged for Predetermination to sinful actions, Thin Sophistry, Collusive ambiguity, *Let. p. 41.* Vain attempts, 38. Dismal conclusions, 36. the effects of a Sophistical wit against sense, and more against the sense of our souls, and most of all against the entire sum and substance of all Morality and Religion at once, p. 39, 40. and overturning and mingling heaven and earth, p. 50. And that reflection you make upon those who have used the distinction of *voluntas signi & Beneplaciti*, that they have only rather concealed a good meaning, than expressed by it a bad one, p. 106. For take all together, and I see not that they amount to a less guilt, than of trampling upon that venerable dust, which was sometimes animated by truly Heroick Souls, and bore the names of Zuinglius, Calvin, Beza, Perkins, Pemble, Davenant, Twisse, Ames, &c. than which no cause hath had, nor needs greater Patrons. But instead of recalling, you have avowed them, by the addition of others of the same sort, a contagion, a deadly thing, *Postsc. p. 15.* An ill coloured opinion, *Postsc. p. 51.* Fearful consequences of that rejected opinion,

opinion; vanity of the subterfuges whereby its assertors think to hide the malignity of it, p. 50. *Nor was this enough, but as if you were Animal gloria, (as was said of the Philosophers) an animal that lived by the air of vain glory and applause, and thought your self another Goliath, you cry out, I defy the armies of Israel this day; give me a man that we may fight together. What other interpretation are these words capable of? Now I perceive that some persons, who had formerly entertained that strange opinion of Gods Predeterminative concurrence to the wickedest actions, and not purged their minds of it, have been offended with that Letter, for not expressing more respect unto it; and yet offered nothing themselves (which to me seems exceeding strange) for the solving of that great difficulty and incumbrance, which it infers upon our Religion, Postsc. p. 7. Or these, If I find my self obliged any way further to intermeddle in this matter, I reckon the time I have to spend in this world can never be spent to better purpose, than in discovering, &c. the inefficacy of the Arguments brought for it, p. 50. but most immodest is your threatening those that assert the contradictory to your Proposition, with your preparations for the defence of it, and plain intimation of the value you put upon them, as sufficient to silence*

let all opposers, p. 51, 52. And for ought
I can judge to the contrary, if contempt of
your Antagonists will dash them out of coun-
tenance, and so silence them, you are likely
enough to obtain the victory you assure your
self beforehand. An instance: whereof you
have given us in your ill treatment of Mr.
Gale, a most pious, modest, and learned man,
and our common friend, and one who like a
friend touched your sore so gently, that one
would have thought you should hardly have
cried Oh! much less have cried out of Vin-
dictive Hostility, p. 16. and that he was the
man that might be instanced in, that had ma-
naged a publick contest with that candour
and fairness, as not at all to intrench up-
on friendship, which you did well know
was possible to be done, (as you express
your self, *ibid.*) And yet how many holes
do you pick in his coat? one while you in-
sinuate that he is of those mens humours
who take an unaccountable pleasure, in de-
praving what is done by others, p. 12. where-
as I who have known him about 25 years,
and was of the same Academical Soci-
ety with you both, have never observed
any such misbehaviour of his. An-
other while, that he had a concealed end
of his own glory, viz. [in attacking
you], (as if the good man had coveted that
inscription upon his Tombstone; — *Magnis
tamen excidit ausis*). And again, assert
that

that he had a mighty strong and irrecon-
cileable inclination to squabble a little with
your Letter, p. 13. And that this inclinati-
on cannot but owe it self to some peculi-
ar aspect and reference he had to the Au-
thor, p. 14. (whereas I dare be his vouch-
er, that all the harm he wishes you is but
an increase of humility). And this guilt
you make account is fastened upon him, be-
cause he hath not attempted sundry others of
former and latter days, which have said much
to the purpose which your Letter does but
touch on the by, p. 13. which is a strange
accusation, and will appear such to those
who shall upon perusal find, that he hath
run the hazard of his safety in meddling with
those Giants you point at, Postsc. p. 14. But
if he had not, I think he might apologize for
himself, that your tract being concise, and
adorned with good language, might invite more
buyers and readers. Ratsbane capt in fine
sugar, may well be judged likely to entice some
liquorish appetite to taste of it, to their own
hurt. But the greatest provocation not to let
you [whoever be let] pass, is that intoler-
able reflection upon the Asserters of Predeter-
mination, upon their Arguments, and the na-
tural consequences of them, all at once in
these words. But the effects of a Sophisti-
cal wit against sense, and more against the
sense of our souls, and most of all against
the entire sum and substance of all Morality
and

and Religion at once, are but like the attempt to batter a wall of brass with straws and feathers, Let. p. 39, 40. This passage alone were enough to raise indignation, sufficient to make a disputant (at least if that passion be as effectual to that purpose as the old shred, — facit indignatio verum, intimates it is to make a Poet). And this was it that made me inquisitive after an answer to your Letter, and Postscript, as to which, when after many rumours of Answers preparing, I found my hopes frustrated, I resolved (though almost too late) to attempt one my self, for my resolution was his in Terence, a quoquam alio quam a me, a me autem potius quam a nemine; that I had rather your answer should come from any one than me, but from me rather than no body. I met with many discouragements in the last clause of my resolution, in general from a consciousness of my own disabilities, and particularly from the hard measure your other Antagonist Mr. Gale hath met with, as in the instances above-mentioned, so in some other. The one, your carping at words, that you make so severe Animadversion upon him for an innocent Pleonasm, The Divine Independent will of God, which meant you no harm, nor was more guilty of any design to rob your Essay of any part of its eloquence, than that was to pilfer from him any part of his collections, Postsc. p. 13.

And I was not without some apprehensions
that I might fall under your lash my self,
who am not curious in the choice of words,
or composure of periods. But against this
fear I was somewhat relieved, as against the
sorrow I had conceived for Mr. Gales affront,
(as if it had fell out for that end, and al-
so to justifie the old saw, aliquando bonus
dormitat Homerus) by an happy accident
that I have taken you tardy twice in that
kind your self: For what else but a Pleasor
is that Phrase, The rectitude of Gods holy
nature, Let. p. 42. and the rectitude of
Gods own most holy will and way, p. 59.
in the excess of your caution, lest any should
think the holy nature, the most holy will and
way of God were void of rectitude, Postle
p. 22. And elsewhere actions malignantly
wicked, p. 32. i. e. wickedly wicked. But
these are childish criminations, unfit to be
bandied from hand to hand by sober persons.
The other discouragement was the difficult in-
vestigation of your sense, which I take to be
a far harder task than to confute it; of
which, that I may not be thought to complain
without cause, I have collected some instances
of repugnant and self-contradicting Proposi-
tions, in your Discourses.

1. *Mediate concurrence.*

1. It sufficiently fulves the rights of the first cause, to assert that no action can be done, but by a power derived from it, which in reference to forbidden actions, intelligent creatures may use or not use as they please, *Let. p. 36.*

2. *All actions good to Mr. Gales Quest.* Is there any action so sinful that hath not some natural good as the substrate matter thereof? *you Answ. True, Postsc. p. 36.*

3. *Predetermination denied as to some actions, (viz.) evil.*

This is the design of all your Letter, from p. 32. to 50. and of the Postscript.

2. *Immediate concurrence.*

1. I do really believe Gods immediate concurrence to all the actions of his creatures, *Post. p. 28.*

2. *Some actions in themselves evil.*

Some actions of the creatures are in themselves most malignantly wicked, *Le. p. 32. and intrinsically evil, p. 46.*

3. *Predetermination to all actions granted.*

The active providence of God about all the actions of men consists not meerly in giving them natural powers, whereby they can work of themselves, but in a real influence upon those powers, *Postsc. p. 39. n. 5.*

By which last clause, a real influence upon those powers, if you mean (as I cannot divine

divine what else you can) in reducing those powers into act, (as your phrase is, lb. n. 6.) you come over to our Camp, and we will give good entertainment to so serviceable a Deserter.

4. Predetermination forces the will.

Nothing is more apparently a simple and most strictly natural impossibility than not to do an action whereto the Agent is determined by an infinite power,

Let. p. 33.

4. Predetermination forces not the Will.

It is unreasonable to imagine that God cannot in any case determine the will of a rational creature, in a way agreeable enough to its nature, Let.

p. 141.

Men are inabled by an internal infusion of power and vital influence to do much good, to which they are not impelled by it, p. 145.

non est ingenii mei hosce nodos dissolvere, i. e. I have not wit enough to untie these knots. The consideration of these repugnancies, fills me with wonder at your exclamation against Mr. Gale, for finding no fault with your Pamphlet but what he makes, Postsc. p. 11. and particularly for suggesting that

that your opinion falls in with the sentiments of Durandus, which many think not well of, Postsc. p. 9. For I must needs profess, that as far as I can judge, he hath but slandered you with a word of truth. For in your Letter, by which Mr. Gale did, and only could take his measure of your sense, there's not the most implicate intimation of any other intendment, than to close with Durandus. And though you do explicitly disown it in your Postsc. yet you instruct not you Reader, how the Grammatical construction of these words above cited, p. 36. of your Let. will yield any other meaning, than what Mr. Gale pitches upon. And the foresight of the probability of being cried out upon for want of candour, in the same respects, did not a little deter me from the undertaking.

A third, the necessity of making a Parallel between your and the Papists Arguments against Predetermination, which I foresaw would give you occasion to fault me, (as you do Mr. Gale), for parallelling your conceptions with theirs, the reason whereof must needs be because I take a Papist for an ill-favoured name, Postsc. p. 27. yet here they are.

1. Some actions are intrinsically evil, and in themselves wicked, *Let. p. 33, 32.*

2. God hath as much influence and concurrence to the worst actions, as the best, *Post. p. 25.* [viz. by the Doctrine of Predetermination of sinful actions.]

3. For God to determine men to the worst of actions, can mean no less thing than to impel them to do them, *Let. p. 37.* which impelling you call an ineluctable fate, *p. 33.* [and so intend compelling.]

4. God hath more influence and concurrence to the worst actions than the sinner or tempter, *Post. pag. 25.* and in more words, *Let. pag. 32.* [viz. by our Doctrine.]

1. There are many actions so intrinsically and in themselves evil, that they always are repugnant to the eternal Law, and Right Reason. *Bell. de Am. c. 18.*

2. Calvin was blasphemous against God in affirming, That God works evil works in us, so as he works good, *Alvarez. de Aux. Gr. l. 4.*

3. God, according to our Adversaries opinion [viz. the Protestants] impells men, and so compells them to sin, *Bell. c. 5.*

4. God according to the opinion of Calvin and Beza is the primary Author of all sins. *Bell. c. 4. de Amiff. Gr.*

But

But pass upon this parallel what judgment you please, I am at a point. I have proposed to my self a good end in the exhibition of it, viz. to mind my Readers that the point under debate between you and me is a stated controversy between the Papists and Protestants, and therefore the affirmative not lightly to be receded from; and in drawing it up I gave my self a little pleasure mixed with disdain; that because there was no Smith found throughout all the land of Israel, you were fain to go down to the Philistines to sharpen your axe and your mattock, 1 Sam. 13. 19, 20. And I admired that you could not excogitate one new Argument, but present us with all old, and strangely unfortunate, which have been basted as often as urged. I have intitled my Answer De Causa Dei, rather than De causa Deo; which latter might be proper enough for the subject, a Defence of Gods interest as the first cause in all the actions of his Creatures. But herein I have imitated Bradwardine's Piety, who would signify thereby that it was the Cause of God he designed to secure from the impetuous assaults of its Adversaries, among whom I am heartily sorry you should be numbred, as to this instance. I know you will not own the charge, but pretend that you are on Gods side, but if so, you have neglected an opportunity of shewing your self, by not reconciling Gods preventive methods of sin with immediate con-

course

course, which is at least as hard as with Pre-
determinative concurrence: and to be sure, any
one may see it was very idle and ludicrous
trifling, to offer at reconciling those methods
with God's Prescience, and to wave that
(manifestly) greater difficulty of reconciling
them with his immediate concurrence, if you
think there is such a thing, (to use your own
words with but the variation that a different
instance requires) Postsc. pag. 3, 4. I have
been as brief as I could in my Answer,
without prejudice to our cause; and have
come (as Cæsar Borgia said of the French
in their Expedition into Italy) rather with
Chalk in my hands to mark out the Inns,
than with Arms to break through and
take possession. It will be time enough to
arm when your Preparations shall rise out of
that dust and silence in which they are buri-
ed, Post. p. 51. In the mean time I have but
pointed out the Fontes solutionum, the general
grounds upon which our Answers depend, to
all Arguments that can be produced. To con-
clude, I could heartily wish you would seriously
reflect upon your Letter and Postscript, and
consider how many passages you are obliged to
repent of and retract. Shall I mind you of that
notable saying of Austin, Illius scripta summa
auctoritate dignissima, &c. i.e. his writings
deserve to be of the greatest authority, who
hath less slip never a word, not that he would,
but that he ought to recall. He that hath

not attained so much wisdom as to be able
to say nothing not to be repented of, may yet
attain so much modesty as to repent of what
he knows he has said amiss, *Aug. Ep. 17.* And
for your encouragement, it may not be unsea-
sonable to mind you, of what you cannot but
know, that Austin who gave this good coun-
sel, did take it himself, and left upon record a re-
tractation of his Errors, wherein he was a
singular instance of humility, and was reward-
ed by God with a greater esteem in the Church
than any one man since his time. Which is all
besides that I am

Octob. 31. 1677.

Your true
Friend and Brother
T. D.

De Causa Dei.

IT has been always judged very need-
ful in Polemicks to state the Question,
and explain the terms, when they la-
bour under any ambiguity, or how-
ever fall not under the apprehension of
those who are to be instructed, for want of
skill in that art or science to which they
belong, or language from which they are
borrowed. In neither of these respects will
it be needless in the Controversie now to be
agitated; not as to the first, because
Mr. *Howe* gives us his sense in various terms,
and such as seem repugnant to each other:
one while that which he denies is, a *Prede-*
terminative concurrence to all actions of the
Creatures, *Let. p. 32.* and *Post. p. 3.* and
Predeterminative concurrence, *Post. p. 19.* another
while 'tis *Predetermining Influence*, *Post. p. 19.*
and a *Determinative influence*, *Let. p. 36.* and
Efficacious influence, *Post. p. 52.* As for the two
former phrases (which are of the same im-
port) they are in effect *contradictio in adjecto*
in their conjunction. I appeal to *Strangius*,
Mr. *H.*'s friend, but my Adversary in the
main Question under consideration, *Hujus-*

modi Predeterminationem nonnulli confundunt cum concursu Dei generali quem concursum primum appellant, &c. i.e. Some confound this kind of *Predetermination* with the general concurrence of God. But they speak very improperly who call *Predetermination* a *primum* [or *Predeterminative*] concurrence, or say that God does by concurrence determine second causes: and he quotes Twisse with approbation, saying, *Concurrere cum agente aliquo modo, &c. i.e.* To concur with an agent some way to the production of an effect, is not to determine that agent. For the Creature also concurs with God to the production of an effect, and yet it does not determine God: therefore nor does God concurring with the Creature determine it to act. Strang. de Vol. Dei, Lib. 2. Cap. 4. p. 161. Strangius does not call the terms a contradiction, I confess, but the reason out of Twisse gave him as just ground (as it does me) to call them. As for the latter phrase, *influence*, which he makes equipollent with the former concurrence, in these words, *I here affect not the curiosity to distinguish these two terms as some do*, Post. p. 29. I had rather he should hear Strangius again, than me blaming his not affecting that curiosity of distinction: *Ceterum nobis operapretium videtur distinguere inter ista duo vocabula concursum & influxum, &c. i.e.* But it seems worth our labour to distinguish between those

those two words *Concourse* and *Influence*, which in this matter are often conjoined and confounded. For first, *Influence* is of a larger extent than *Concourse*. For the causality of every Cause, especially the Efficient, is called *Influence*. And therefore in many instances there may be observed an *Influence* of God, when yet there is no *concourse*, as when he acts, not making use of any second cause. Again, although in the *concourse* of two Causes each of them are considered as having their *Influence*, yet the word *Influence* is absolute, and noting a respect to another cause; but the word *Concourse* is relative to another cause. Strang. de Vol. Deit. l. c. 11. p. 59. As for the term *Efficacious*, it suits us well enough, if Mr. H. intends by it an *Infallibility* of the event, or the certain production of those actions which God hath an *Influence* upon. The ambiguity of Mr. H. phrases removed, and the sense of them brought to a certainty, I assert the contradictory to his Proposition, *That God doth not by an Efficacious influence universally move and determine men to all their actions, even those that are most wicked*, Post. p. 52. Which if we might be allowed the liberty of our own terms, we would thus lay down, That God does determine, or pre-determine, or move all Creatures to all and each of their actions. Strangius fairly enough cites our Thesis, lib. 2. cap. 4. pag. 155. The Que-

tion then to be discussed is, Whether God does determine or predetermine all Creatures to all and each of their actions? So *Serap.* fairly, l. 2 c. 4 p. 155. Unless it may seem meet to add that *reduplicative particle*, as *such*, because of Mr. *Howe's* addition, *even those that are most wicked*, Post. p. 52. As to which it is to be noted, that we who assert Predetermination of all actions of the Creatures, do limit it to the actions considered abstractly from the moral good or evil adhering to them: as for instance, we hold Gods Predetermination of the natural act whereby *David* begat a child in Adultery, as well as of those whereby he begat children in lawful Matrimony; and of the use of his tongue in telling a lie to *Abimelech* the Priest, as well as in praising God. Whereas Mr. *Howe* limits Gods Predetermination only to morally [or spiritually] good actions, as *such*, Posti. p. 39. n. 6. Which Predetermination special, we grant; but withal assert a general, which extends to evil actions. In which we consider,

1. *The subject*; and as to this we say that sin is in that which is good, the nature of man and his faculties and actions, and these God excites and guides efficaciously. And this subject is called the *material* or substrate matter of sin.

2. *The end*; and thus though not the nature,

ture, yet the existence of sin is good, or it is good that sin should be, because God draws good out of it; and hence God predetermines to the natural actions, though he knows sin will adhere to them. The grand term then to be explained is *Predetermination*, or (as some Divines and Metaphysicians sometimes call it) *Precourse* and *Premotion*, of which terms the former which signifies a fore appointment, is either from eternity, or in time. The latter two, only in time. The former (*viz.*) *Predetermination*, is either from eternity, and so is an immanent act of Gods, that is, of his will to produce in time all the actions of his Creatures; or in time, which is the actual production of all those actions which he had decreed to produce. And of this latter only is the Question to be discussed understood; and this act of Gods is called *Predetermination*, because it limits the creature to this action rather than to that; and 'tis called a *Precourse*, or *Premotion*, i.e. a running before, or fore motion, (as I may so speak), because in order of nature it is before the action of the creature. Again, *Predetermination* [or *Precourse*, or *Premotion*], is distinguished into *Physical* or *Moral*. The latter, I grant may be ascribed to God with reference to good actions as such, but not with respect to evil actions, unless the proposing objects

and occasions of sin may (as some learned men judg) be reduced to the actions of a moral cause. But whether the moral act of God in commanding, threatening, promising, &c. may be justly denominated Predetermination, will remain dubitable till another doubt be resolved, (*viz.*) Whether the will do always follow the last practical dictate of the understanding. Against the affirmative of which Question (to note that *obiter*) the most acute and learned Wallis seems to oppose an irrefragable Argument, *viz.* that the Will then is not disabled by the full more than the will of the confirmed Angels and Saints in Heaven. Wallis Truth tried against the Lord Brook, p. 53. But let Predetermination Moral fall or stand, our Question is not of that, but of Physical Predetermination, as appears in that we make it common to all creatures, some whereof are not capable of a Moral Predetermination, (supposing that to be) which yet is not intended to be agitated at present, but only that which is exercised about free agents, that is, rational creatures. Which that it may be done with more clearness, and may in part obviate some of our learned Antagonist's objections, we shall endeavour, with as much accuracy as is needful to a discourse that will fall into other than learned mens hands, to consider

consider *Predetermination* as contradistinguished, or opposed rather to two things, which are acknowledged by him as Gods Acts respecting the actions of free agents, (not excluding natural), (*viz.*) *Conservation* and *immediate Concourse, or Concurrence*; the concession of the former of which two, will not be found sufficient to entitle God to the honour of the first cause of his creatures actions; and of the latter will (unless we take our measures amiss) enforce him to grant that *Predetermination* which now he denies. First as to *Conservation*, we must observe, that as Creation stands opposed to nothing; so Conservation to Annihilation, i. e. making that cease to be something which was so; and it differs from Creation only in this, that it notes a continuation of that being, and its powers and faculties, which were given by creation, as being a continuation of that action by which it was produced; and therefore is commonly stiled *continua creatio*, and not unfitly termed by the School-men *manutentionis Dei*, i. e. Gods hand-holds, because by it God holds up all things, as it were, with an hand from falling into nothing; by the withdrawing of which, Divines generally think the world would be annihilated.

Secondly, As to *concourse or concurrence*,
it

it may be thus defined; *It is an extrinſick action of God, by which he does with ſecond cauſes, [or the creatures] immediately produce all their natural actions and effects.*

1. *It is an action of God* to diſtinguiſh it from the power communicated and conſerved to ſecond cauſes, (by which they perform their ſeveral operations) by *creation and conſervation.* 2. *Extrinſick* to diſtinguiſh it from his Decree of this action called *concoure*, which decree is an intrinſick action. 3. *With ſecond cauſes*, or the creatures, becauſe it is ſuch an action as joins with the creature; as when the Writing-Maſter and the Scholar ſhape the ſame letter by the Maſters guiding the Scholars hand. 4. I add, *all their actions*, and what is produced by action or the *effects*, as when the Maſter and Scholar write; not only is the action the ſame, but the effect; the letters are the ſame which are done by both together. 5. *Natural actions and effects*, to exclude what by accident adheres to the actions and effects; which ſeeing they are defects, cannot be produced by a proper efficiency, and ſo nor God concur to the production of them by ſuch efficiency. 6. *Immediately produce*, to note the intimacy of the conjunction of God with the creature in the production of natural actions; which is ſuch, that one
and

and the same action is the action of God
and of the creature.

3. As to *Predetermination*, it is thus de-
fined. *It is a transient action of God which
excites every creature to act.* It is called a
transient action of God, in opposition to
inmanent, or the Will and Decree of God
that the creature should act. That is di-
stinguished from Concourſe or Concurrence
thus: 1. The very difference of the par-
ticles, *Præ* and *Con*, i. e. *Before* and *with*,
notes that the former is in order of na-
ture (though not of time), *before* the crea-
ture's action, the latter with it. 2. That
the former notes the reduction of the
creature's powers into act: the latter notes
Gods acting with the creature. 3. The
former is to be conceived of *per modum
principii*, under the notion of a principle,
or cause of the creatures acting: the
latter only, *per modum actionis*, i. e. as im-
porting Gods acting with the creature.
The *Terminus* or object of that action
of Gods, which we call *Predetermination*,
is the second cause it self, the reasonable
creature: but the *Terminus* or object of that
action of Gods, called *concourse* or *concur-
ſus*, is the action of the second cause, and
effect produced by that action. So that the
question in plain words is, *Whether God
does move men to all their natural actions,*
and

and so to one rather than another. The Protestants generally maintain the affirmative, and how forcibly Mr. *Howe* opposes it, remains now to be considered.

The terms explained, we shall endeavour a defence of our Arguments, which Mr. *Howe* hath thought meet to single out.

The first of the two Arguments of ours which seeming most importunate and enforcing, he hath attempted to enervate, is.

Arg. 1. That it necessarily belongs to the Original and Fountain-Being to be the first Cause of whatsoever Being; and consequently, that what there is of positive Being is any the most wicked action, must principally owe it self to the determinative productive influence of this first and Sovereign Cause. Otherwise, it would seem that there were some Being that were neither primum, nor a primo, [i. e. neither the first Being, nor from the first Being], Let. p. 35.

Ans. To which he Answers, It may well be thought sufficiently to save the rights and privileges of the first Cause, to assert that no action can be done, but by a power derived from it; which in reference to forbidden actions, intelligent Creatures may use or not use as they please, without asserting, that they must be irresistibly determined also, even to the worst of actions done by them, Let. p. 36.

Reply

Reply. For the better understanding of our Argument, and the proof thereto annexed; together with Mr *Howes* Answer thereunto, it will not be unneedful to reduce them to Syllogisms: the Argument thus,

All positive Being are effects of the first Cause. All sinful actions, as actions, [for that is our limitation], are positive Beings. *Ergo*, All sinful actions [as actions] are effects of the first Cause, [viz. God].

The Major [or first proposition] is proved by an Hypothetical Syllogism, thus: If all positive Beings are not effects of the first Cause, then there is some positive Being which is neither *primum* [ens] nor *a primo*, [i. e.] neither the first Being, nor from the first Being, [or which is neither God nor a Creature]. But there is no positive Being which is neither the first Being, nor from the first Being. *Ergo*, All positive Beings are effects of the first Cause. To the Argument it self Mr. *Howe* replies nothing, nor yet to the proof, in form (as by the Laws of Argumentation he was obliged). But seems to distinguish in the Major between a double dependance, which positive Beings have upon God as the first Cause; one, that they have no power but from God; the other, that the exercise or use of that power is from God

God. The former he grants; the latter he denies, but with a limitation as to forbidden actions.

To which we Reply,

1. That this Answer is fatal to his own Concession of *Gods immediate concurrence to all the actions of his Creatures*. Postsc. p. 28. For it amounts to as much, as if *in terminis*, he had asserted immediate concurrence only to some actions, (*viz.* forbidden actions; and this was the passage I presume that gave Mr. Gale occasion to charge Mr. *Howe* with *Durandus* his Opinion, which was, That God concurs remotely and mediately with second Causes, (*viz.*) no otherwise than as he confers and conserves their Essence and Power of action, by which they themselves act nextly and immediately. And for ought I can yet understand a very just occasion for though Mr. *Howe* in the place above cited acknowledges immediate concurrence yet in the Letter it self, by which Mr. *Gale* was to make an estimate of his judgment, there was *ne grū quidem*, not a Syllable of any such thing.

2. It is hard to conceive the reason of Mr. *Howe's* limitation; why forbidden actions should be only by power derived from God; and good actions or indifferent require also an irresistible determination.

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
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when the material of the actions morally diversified is often the very same. For instance, In the motion of my hand to kill another out of spleen and private revenge, or to kill my enemy in a lawful self-defence, or to strike my friend in merriment. I am aware that he attempts to wipe off the aspersion of symbolizing with *Durandus*, because he denies immediate concurrence universally, whereas himself denies only determinative concurrence to wicked actions, *Postsc.* p. 28, 29. And be it so, that his attempt hath been successful, yet I must give *Durandus* the precedence of Mr. *Howe* for sagacity in this point; and do judge that he spake more consonantly to himself, and the truth, when he affirmed that the indetermination of the power given to the creature, was so universal, as to extend equally to evil actions and to good. For it seems evident enough that all natural actions, as such, [the Subjects of moral good and evil] must either have, or want immediate concurrence.

3. This Answer runs counter to Mr. *Howe's* assertion elsewhere, That in reference to sinful actions by this influence [determinative] God doth not only sustain men who do them, and continue to them their natural faculties and powers whereby they are done, which is all Mr. *Howe* hath granted us hither-

hitherto in his Answer to our Argument, from the dependance of the second Cause upon the first]; but also as the first mover, so far excite and actuate those powers, as that they are apt and habile for any congenerous action, &c. *Postsc.* p. 41. For if by exciting and actuating the powers, he means that God reduces them to act, he hath taken a large jump from *Durandus* to *Twisse*: for the latter (nor we who follow him) neither says nor means any more by Predetermination. And we cannot tell what other meaning to affix to his words, without upbraiding him with strange inadvertency in his choice of them. For else he confounds Concurrence either with *Conservation*; which latter keeps the powers apt and habile [as they are made] or with *Predetermination*, whereas this goes before, that goes along with the Creatures act.

But now I attend to the proof of his strange Assertion, for a proof I understand it to be) though he introduces it with a *Besides*; (a particle which commonly is a sign of an additional Argument) which thus presents it self.

Ans. It seems infinitely to detract from the perfection of the ever blessed God, to affirm he was not able to make a creature of such a nature as being continually sustained by him, and supplied with power every moment suitable to

its nature, should be capable of acting, unless whatsoever he thus enables, he determine [that is, for it can mean no less thing, impel] it to do it also. Let. p. 36, 37.

Rep. 1. If we should take liberty of judging things by their appearance at first sight, without giving our selves the trouble of a strict disquisition, we might easily be seduced into an imagination, that it does no less infinitely detract from the Divine Perfection; to affirm, That God was not able to make a Creature of such a nature, as that it might continually sustain it self, without a supply of power every moment from God; for that opinion seems to tie God to a shorter tedder, than an ingenuous Artificer, who can raise an Edifice that shall last many years, without any need of his help for reparations.

And this I the rather take notice of, because I find it the sentiment of the most acute Suarez, That they who deny Gods immediate Operation in every action of the creature, [which Mr. H. seems to do in his Answer now under discussion] will doubtless be compelled to deny that the Creature does depend immediately upon the actual assistance of God. For (which is his reason) that which depends not upon God in acting, nor does it depend upon him in its being. Met. sup. 20.

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2. This

2. This confirmation of Mr. H. Assertion is guilty of two unpardonable faults in a man of Learning and Ingenuity, (*viz.*) a too early *anticipation*, and immodest *begging* of the main *Question*. An *anticipation*, in acknowledging the *impelling*, i. e. *compelling* (so that is his sense of the term, as will appear e're long) men to act, as the import of Proposition determining; whereas there is no necessity of hooking in such an import of it: for suppose it no way to abridge the liberty of the Will, yet by Mr. H's Argumentation, it is *eo nomine* to be rejected, because the sustaining the Creature and supplying it with power every moment suitable to its nature [that is, in *Durandus* stile, *mediate concurrence*] is to be judged sufficient to enable the Creature to act, without determining to action; upon no less peril to them that shall dare to judge it insufficient, than to be reputed detractors from the Perfection of the ever-blessed God. And a *begging* of the *Question* 'tis, which I may well call immodest, because he knows we neither can nor will grant it, without ruining our Hypothesis, nor need we do it, because he elsewhere owns it *unreasonable* to imagine that God can act not in any case determine the will of a rational Creature, in a way agreeable enough to its nature. Let. p. 141.

I confess he gives us here but an inch, but the

we will venture to take an ell; I mean, to extend his concession of some cases to every case, and particularly to our case of sinful actions. For let our sentiment be burdened with what other load Mr. *H.* shall please (as the truth is he is not over-merciful to the Predeterminants) I think he hath discharged it of forcing the will, till he hath evinced a specialty in our case, which will be somewhat an uneasy task, though we should grant him his own option, that God predetermines to sinful actions *in concreto*, i.e. to the actions and sinfulness of them too; for upon that supposition there is less necessity to imagine that God cannot determine the will in a way agreeable enough to mans [corrupt] nature; because he does but determine it to what it hath an innate propension to of itself; and so Gods determination is but as the wind in a mans back, which puts him on a little faster in the way he was going before.

3. We are at a great loss as to Mr. *H.*'s meaning, whether it be that it is a detracti-
on from Gods perfection, to affirm, God was not able to make a Creature that could not act universally without determination, or particularly as to forbidden actions; the generality of the terms calls for the former sense, the conclusion he was to prove, for the latter,

(18)
1. If the former sense be that he will own, I seem to my self fairly allowed to infer, that then man in his primitive state had not, nor have the good Angels at present, any Divine determination to good actions, because to both unnecessary; and unnecessary it must be presumed, because it is a detraction from Gods Perfection to conceive he could not make them of such a nature, as that they should not need it, and because they had no *disinclination to be overcome by an efficaciously determinative influence*, (which is the reason Mr. H. gives of the necessity of Predetermination to holy actions in the lapsed state. *Post. p. 35.* Which if it be of any force makes it unnecessary to a state of Integrity.) And if this inference be natural, I wonder not that Man fell, but that he fell not as soon as he was set upon his legs; nor that some of the good Angels turned Rebels so soon to their Sovereign Lord, but how the rest persevere in their Loyalty. I have hitherto swom with the stream of Protestant Divines, (not because it was easie, but in my apprehension safe) who have conceived the good Angels security an effect of a greater degree of *determinative influence*, (to borrow Mr. H's Phrase) or *corroborating grace*, that is, in the terms of the Question now agitated, Predetermination, than was afforded to the [now] bad Angels; or to speak more strictly

ly of the continuance of that Predetermination to the one, which was suspended as to the other : which conception of Divines (to note that in passage) may be easily freed from the imputation of reflecting either upon Gods Holiness, Justice, or Truth; upon the first, because God by the suspension of Predetermination was no more the Efficient of the Angels sin, than the Sun of the darkness that overspreads the air, when it hath withdrawn its rays; upon the second, for it is a ruled case in the Schools, *Non datur justitia proprie dicta inter Deum & Creaturas*; i.e. *God cannot be properly said to be a debtor to his Creatures*; no not when he hath passed a promise to them, for even then, (if we will speak strictly) he is a debtor to himself, namely to his own truth and fidelity, not to them; and if he should (to suppose an impossibility for illustration-sake) break his word, he would be but *Mendax, non injurius*, a *Liar, not unjust*. Not upon his Truth, for he was not under the bond of a promise, (as he is to the part of repaired Mankind, whom we denominate Saints) to preserve the Angels from Apostacy. As for those who take this Doctrine for a blemish upon Gods goodness, I turn them over to God himself, for a reconciliation of these two seemingly contradictory Propositions, contained in his Word, and within the verge of

our own experience, that God is good, and [yet] that he hath permitted a passage for sin, which he could have impeded. — In the latter sense be avowed, as a genuine interpretation of Mr. H's mind; I know not how it will be able to save its credit, if I should charge it with being guilty of this gross absurdity, viz. a supposal that God made Man with an ability to do sinful actions *in concreto*, i. e. the natural actions, and sin that adheres to them. 'Tis true, God made Man mutable, and how could he do otherwise? (unless he should have made him a God) which very terms involve an insufferable contradiction) and so in a remote capacity of sinning. But Mr. H's words import a next or immediate capacity of acting, which the Creature is capable of, as soon as it starts out of nothing into something, without the intervenient aid of Predetermination. I am very averse from thinking this to be Mr. H's meaning; and I would offer him a friendly hand (if he would accept of it) to help him out of the pit he is fallen into, by minding him of our distinction between the *materiale* and *formale* of sin, the natural action that is the subject, and the sin that is the [inseparable] adjunct, in our temporary estate: which distinction supposed, in conjunction with Mr. H's Hypothesis, Mr. H's meaning will be freed from the *inconveniences*

and for — I in no if this God Et and God o im suf ca m ng as th ti to im t) by ne ti ne y n- ed w
now inferred upon it ; and it will amount to no more than that the power of acting God gave to man, suffices to the natural actions, since sin adhered to them, as well as before, without the help of Predetermination. But then this friendly hand will prove unfriendly in the issue ; for though it may clear him of one, yet it will entangle him in many absurdities, or (at least) self-contradictions : For then,

1. How shall he quit himself from the blame of being a Favourer of *Durandus Hypothesis* ? for the sense is the same, and the words not much different. And yet why should he once attempt it, seeing that Hypothesis serves his professed design of quitting God of the blame of being the Author of Sin, with much officiousness : and that he may accept this suggestion the more kindly, a most Learned hand shall tender it to him : *Some are of opinion that God hath no immediate influence, but mediate only, in respect of voluntary agents. And according to this opinion it is easie to clear God from the imputation of being the Author of Sin, and yet to acknowledge his concurrence with second Causes, in producing their defective effects. If the will of the Creature, saith Scotus, C. 2. Dist. 37. Q. 1. were the total and immediate cause of her action, and that God had no immediate efficiency, but mediate only in respect thereof, as*

Some think: It were easie according to that opinion to shew how God may be freed from the imputation of being the Author of Sin, and yet to acknowledg his concurrence with second Causes, for the producing of their effects: for whether we speak of that which is material or formal in sin, the will only should be the total cause of it, and God should no way be a cause of it but mediately, in that he caused and produced such a will, that might as her pleasure do what she would. Durandus seemeth to incline to this opinion, supposing that second Causes do bring forth their actions and operations by and of themselves, and that God no otherwise concurreth actually to the production of the same, but in that he preserveth the second Causes in that being and power of working, which first he gave them. Thus far the most Learned Dr. Field, of the Church, B. 3. Ch. 23. pag. 121, 122. And yet he adds his dislike of Durandus opinion in these words: But they that are of sounder judgment resolve, that as the light enlighteneth the air, and with the air all other inferiour things: so God not only giveth being and power of working to the second Causes, and preserveth them in the same, but together with them hath an immediate influence into the things that are to be effected by them, &c. Ibid. p. 122.

3. What account can be given of his exploding our distinction between the material and

and formal part of sin? [approved of above
by Dr. Field]. Most of his way, (viz. Mr.
Gales) mince the business, and say, the con-
currence is only to the action, which is sin-
ful; not as sinful, so Mr. Howe's Postsc.
p. 33.

Answer. Except it were affirmed, that it
implied a contradiction for God to make such
a creature, there is no imaginable pretence,
why it should not be admitted he hath done
it. Let, p. 37. and subjoins soon after, I
must confess a greater disposition to wonder
ever such a thing should be disputed,
than dispute so plain a case, p. 38.

Reply. That it is affirmed, Mr. Howe
cannot surely be ignorant; nay, he frees
himself from that blame. I am not alto-
gether ignorant what attempts have been
made to prove it impossible, p. 38. but in
the interim he incurs another of contradict-
ing himself.

This Argument, *ab absurdo*, from the im-
plication of Gods making a creature inde-
pendent upon himself, is urged against those
that deny immediate concurrence (and so
by just consequence conservation) and Pre-
determination.

1. As to mediate concurrence, 'tis urged
for it by Durandus, That there is no repug-
nancy nor contradiction for God to make a
creature that should be able to act without
his

his help [otherwise, that is, than by conserving its being and powers]. To this is Answered, *Involvere repugnantiam quod creatura sit potens, &c.* That it involves a repugnancy and contradiction, that the creature should be able to act independently upon the Creator as well in respect of the created cause it self, which hath necessarily a power of acting commensurate and proportionable to its own being, as in respect of the action or effect flowing from it; for seeing they are Beings by participation, they essentially depend upon the first Being. Wherefore, as the Divine power cannot produce a Being independent upon him in its Being, so nor produce an Agent independent upon him in acting. Suarez. Metaph. T. 1. D. 22. n. 16. One egg is not more like another, than Durandus Argument to Mr. *Howe's*; nor can a more solid Answer be given thereto, no, though Mr. *Howe* should acknowledge immediate concurrence, (as in his *Postsc.* he does) of which, in his whole Letter there is *altum silentium*, and deny only Predetermination: for this Answer is a shoe that will fit either foot (as will appear in its place).

2. As to conservation, the no-necessity of Gods continual influx to that end seems colourably affirmed upon this ground too, That it is not repugnant to Omnipotency to produce such creatures, as when once made,

may continue their Being; though the operation of the Agent cease, by which they were produced. To this Argument Suarez also gives a rational reply; *Ad amplitudinem dominantis potentie spectat, &c.* It belongs to the amplitude of the Divine Power, that nothing itself, nor can be a moment after its production without its influence; and also that it have full dominion over all his creatures, and an intrinsic power of annihilating them, by the suspension or withholding of his influence, Suarez. Met. T. 1. D. 21. n. 2, 17.

3. Which is directly to our case upon Mr. Howe's explication of his mind, that he does really believe Gods immediate concurrence to all actions of his creatures, both *in immediatione virtutis & suppositi*, yet not determinative to wicked actions, Postic. p. 28. We shall adventure a demonstration, that it implies a contradiction for God to make a creature that can act without Predetermination, i. e. applying it to action, and to one rather than another action; and 'tis this, that such a creature would be but *ens secundarium*, a second being; not *causa secunda*, a second cause, or (which is all one) God should be but *ens primum*, not *causa prima*; not the first Being, not the first Cause; which I prove thus.

Arg. 1. If God does concur only by simultaneous concurrence, and not by Predetermination.

mination, or *previous motion*, then God can not be the cause of the actions of the creatures as they proceed from them. But the *consequent* is absurd; and Mr. *Howe* I presume, will not own it. Therefore it is the *Antecedent*. The *Consequence* is proved thus; God is not by *concourse* the cause of the actions of the creatures, as those actions proceed from them, because then *concourse* must be before the action of the creature (for every Physical cause is before the effect), but the very name *concourse*, imports a joyning together in the same action, as the Master and Scholar, whose hand is guided in shaping the same letter. And all consent, in *concourse*, neither does God act before the creature, nor the creature before God; but both together, and at once.

Arg. 2. To make good the English Proverb, *He is twice killed, that is killed with his own weapon*. I shall retort, Mr. *Howe's* two concessions upon him.

1. If *there be an immediate concourse*, then there is a Predetermination, or putting the creature upon action before it acts; or else the creature is the first mover of it self to action. The *consequence* is plausible enough, as depending on this ground, that by *concourse* alone we have no account given us how God and the creature join in one individual

individual action rather than another. As for instance, in the state of innocency, when man was incircled with a variety of trees of the Garden, all good and fit for food, whence was it that he will'd to eat of one rather than another. The concurrence of God with *Adam's* will in the election of one (suppose that in the midst of the Garden, before the prohibition passed upon it) could not determine it to that rather than to any of the rest, as is plain in external actions. Two men launching a wherry-boat concur to the same effect; but the one does not determine the other, by lending common assistance to that act. There must be therefore a Predetermination in order of nature, though not of time, to that act of *Adam's* will [supposed] of eating that tree instanced in, to which God concurred. This may be illustrated by the example of a Writing-Master and his Scholar, wherein there is a concurrence to the action of writing, and its effect the letter written; and also a Predetermination, a putting the Scholar upon the action of writing, (not *morally*, for that influence is discerned in commanding a Scholar to write by himself; but *Physically*, by putting his hand on the Scholars to write, and to write one letter rather than another. An account how the particular action of any rational creatures

creatures will, comes to be determined upon the exclusion of Predetermination, know none can be given. Not by chance, upon the occasional sudden presentation of an object; because the action is Gods (who is not liable to any such impressions) as well as the creatures; not by the creatures self-determining power, for that, as such, is indeterminate as to the acts to which we conceive it must be some way or other determined. And these two Propositions are so evident, that *concurrence immediate* does not determine the will, and that yet it must be determined, that *Baronius* himself, who is an Antipredeterminant, does acknowledge both, *Met. 7, 8. Disp. 3. n. 66.* and he does suggest a reason against any necessity laid upon a thing by Divine Prescience, which we will accept of for a necessity of Divine Predetermination to the acts of the will. *Illud solum imponit necessitatem alicui rei, quod est prima ratio cur illa res non potuit non evenire, i. e. That alone imposes necessity upon any thing which is the first reason or cause why that thing could not but fall out.* *Baron. Met. 7, 12. D. 2. n. 59.* [which necessity, that it excludes not the liberty of mans will, shall be cleared in due time].
¶ 2. Again, from the necessity conceded by *Mr. Howe*, of *immediate concurrence and Predetermination to the production of good actions,*

we shall infer the necessity of both to
all actions: This necessity must take its rise
either from something common to all actions,
or peculiar to good actions. The removing
the latter, will be the fixing the
former in its due place. In order hereunto,
we must consider that grace is an habit
seated in the natural faculties, and fitting
them for good actions; which as it was
concreated with them in innocency; so in
the lapsed estate it is re-created, or created
again by infusion: which *infusion* is not *Pre-*
determination: for this latter still presup-
poses the former. There must be grace in
habit before it can be acted. Now then
the Query is, whether the *terminus* of Pre-
determination be the habit or the faculties;
not the *habit*, for that is a Quality that
moderates the faculties, and so the actions,
in genere morali, and cannot be put
upon action, or one rather than another,
but *mediante potentia*, by the intervention
of the power or faculty in which the gra-
cious habit resides. It must then be the
faculties; the will for instance (for of that
is the grand inquiry), for otherwise (sup-
posing what has been owned, that holy ha-
bits fit the will for holy volitions and so-
lutions) in what degree the habits are con-
firmed, in that the will may act without
Predetermination, and produce sincerely
good

good actions as it please, as long as the good actions are done by a power derived originally from it, [which is Mr. Howe's Hypothesis, and judged by him sufficient to save the rights and privilege of the first cause, with reference to forbidden actions. Let. p. 36.] and I see not, why not as well with reference to commanded actions] The result of this ratiocination, will be, that if it be the indetermination of the powers to individual actions that makes an excitation of them to one rather than another necessary; and the possibility of action contained in the powers, that makes the reducing of that possibility to action no less necessary to good actions, then the consequence seems immovable, that Predetermination in its two Branches is alike necessary to all actions, even when they flow from a will tainted with vicious habits and inclinations. *Quod erat demonstrandum* And to me this Argument seems to carry along with it *triumphant evidence*, (to borrow one of Mr. Howe's lofty Epithetes, Let. p. 62.) my fancy labours under so despicable poverty as to be unable to supply me with any evasion.

As for Mr. Howe's phrase of *impelling*, by which he intends *compelling*, we shall refer the word and thing to the Head, where it will most properly fall under examination.

mination. In the interim, let us attend to what he subjoins.

Ans. I confess a disposition to wonder that a matter whereupon all moral Government depends, both humane and divine, should not have been determined at the first sight, Let. p. 38.

Reply. These words imply, that all moral Government, &c. is rendred ludicrous, and a meer Pageantry by the Doctrine of Pre-determination; but upon what Mr. Howe, magisterially enough, takes for granted, but does not once make an offer of proving, that the will is hindered by Gods own irresistible counter-action, p. 37. from yielding obedience to such Government: But if I live till that be proved, my age will certainly exceed Methuselahs.

Ans. But Mr. Howe adds, The notion of the goodness and righteousness of God, methinks should stick so close to our minds, and create such a sense in our souls, as should be infinitely dearer to us than all our senses and powers. And that we should rather chuse to have our sight, hearing, and motive power, and what not besides disputed, or even torn from us, than ever suffer our selves to be disputed into a belief, that the Holy and Good God should irresistibly determine the wills of men to, and punish the same thing, Let. p. 19.

Reply. The sum of the Argument, though accompanied with a long train of fine words is, that Predetermination to sinful action crosses the natural notions of mankind concerning Gods Goodness and Holiness. To which we return.

1. That there is not the least colour for any such consequence from our Doctrine but upon supposition of two things; which Mr. *Howe* would fasten upon us, but we disown.

1. That God *predetermines to sinful actions, in concreto*, i. e. to the natural action and the sinfulness of it: which we constantly deny: for though we own it a hard province to answer all objections that may be started against this partition made between the one and the other, as to Gods influence, which we affirm as to the former, *the action*, and deny, as to the latter, *the sinfulness of it*; yet we doubt not (in its season) to evince these two things, that God is the Author, and consequently the Predeterminer of all the actions of rational creatures, (for as to irrational, though we include them, yet the Question not being of them, we shall not intermeddle with them); and that God is not the Author of the sinfulness, and so not the Predeterminer thereof. And then as to the *modus*, or manner of Gods influence, so as to se-

parate

parate these that are so neerly conjoined in sinful creatures, we shall be less solicitous, at least with respect to Mr. *Howe's* satisfaction, who has professed that he can more easily be satisfied, to be ignorant of the *modus*, [i. e. manner], or *medium*, [i. e. the mean] of Gods knowledg, whilst he is sure of the thing; and he knows not why any sober-minded man might not be so too, while we must all be content to be ignorant of the manner, yea, of the nature too of a thousand things besides, when, that such things there are, we have no doubt. And when there are few things about which we can with less disadvantage suffer our being ignorant, or with less disreputation profess to be so, Let. p. 49, 50. And if this Argumentation be true, in reference to Divine acts in general (as there is no reason why it should be limited to Gods knowledg only, and himself extends it beyond that); I conceive Mr. *Howe* has against his will given us the cause; for that God is not the Author of sin (our last proposition) he every where affirms as well as we. That God is the Author of all the actions of rational creatures, he grants too; or else his words are unintelligible, and we have cause to quarrel with him, (as he did with *Perseus*, a crabbed Poet), *si non vult intelligi, cur vult legi*, i. e. If he would not be understood,

why would he be read, (an end that every man is presumed to intend that writes) these words, I mean, *This active providence of God about all the actions of men, consists not meerly in giving them the natural powers, whereby they can work of themselves, but in a real influence upon those powers*, Postscript. p. 39. By which last clause, if he intends *reducing them to act* (as his phrase is, *ibid.*) we are perfectly agreed so far; and the remaining disagreement will be but about the *modus* or *manner*, how God affords a real influence upon the powers defiled with sin; and yet none upon the sin it self. And of this he and I being both (I hope) sober-minded men, may well be content to be ignorant, as long as we are sure of the thing. But I fear I reckon without my Host, and so must reckon again; I mean, that Mr. *Howe* will not stand to my compromise of the difference between us, though I see not why he should not, if he will be but a man of his word, stand, that is, to his own Assertions.

2. Our Doctrine cannot be accused of a confederacy, to raze out the impressions of Gods Holiness upon humane nature; but upon this supposition also, *That God does irresistibly determine the wills of man to that which he punishes men for, viz. to sin*, which is a brat we are not bound to father.

ther. For we neither own *irresistible* nor *resistible* determination of mans will to sin, as such; nor do we acknowledg any determination of the will at all to be *irresistible*, if he takes that term for equivalent to *compulsory*; which if he do not, it will be neither a friend to him, nor foe to us.

We might also observe upon his Rhetorical amplifications of his Argument, that he seems to be no ill-willer to *Transubstantiation*. For if the *natural notions* of Gods *goodness* should be infinitely dearer to us than our senses, I see not why the notion of Gods sincerity, that he means as he speaks, should not challenge a share in our indearments; and so why, *Hoc est corpus meum*, should not assure us, that the bread is transubstantiated, though our senses, sight, taste, feeling, join in a common testimony, that it remains bread after consecration, as well as before: not that I charge him with that *Popish ridicule*, but I would have him take notice how dangerous sometimes an affectation of embellishments of speech may prove, by leaving him that is guilty of it, at the mercy of his Antagonist, in deducing such inferences from them, as can neither be safely admitted, nor creditably turned off.

Ans. Mr. *Howe* complains of the feebleness

bleness and impotency of our defence against the forenamed charge, that God makes a Law, and necessitates the violation of it; when it is no more than, That man is under the Law, and God above it, Let. p. 40, 41. and he affirms, that a tender spirit, &c. will not be relieved or eased by the thin Sophistry of only a collusive ambiguity in the word Law, &c. *ibid.*

Reply. If Mr. Howe's candour did but bear any tolerable proportion to his Eloquence, he would never have thus represented our Answer. For the truth is, this Answer is not given by the *Predeterminants* to that objection to which he applies it (as is plain enough, because we always esteem our selves unconcerned in the charge of representing God as necessitating the violation of his own Law), but to another, (*viz.*) that God sins when he produces that action with man, which to man is sin, (which Mr. Howe, who in words at least owns immediate concurrence to all actions as well we, is therefore equally concerned to answer). For the proof of this, I shall alledge *Bellarmino* who (after he had told us, it was only *Zuinglius's* Answer to the same Objection that Mr. H. fits it to; adds with the peril of his reputation), *Sententiam tamen aliorum quorundam, &c. i. e. That it was the opinion of others also, who*

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though they agreed not with Zuinglius, in teaching that God impels men to sin, yet they use no other medium to evince how God does not sin, when he produces that action with man, which to man is sin, than that God is bound by no Law, and nothing is sin but a transgression of a Law, Bell. de Amiff. Gr. l. 2. c. 8. Yet withal I deny not, but 'tis also applied to that Objection, that God sins, if he does determine to that action, to which sin inseparably cleaves. But yet the necessitation of the violation of the Law, is no way concerned in the objection.

What now is become of Mr. Howe's charge of thin Sophistry, and collusive ambiguity, when we deny God to be under a Law, in the same signification of the word, wherein we affirm it of man, (*viz.* as Mr. Howe expresses it), For the declared pleasure of a Ruler to a Subject, p. 41. This charge disproved, we yet grant what Mr. Howe objects; that the term Law, as noting an habitual principle, and rule of acting after one steady tenour, in which sense the perfect rectitude of Gods nature is an eternal Law to him, &c. *Lat.* p. 41, 42, is yet an Argument against our opinion upon Mr. Howe's Hypothesis, that thereby the creature is necessitated to sin; but that he hath neither attempted, nor ever will be able to prove. If proof could be made

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that the consequence were natural, we should not know how to decline the force of Bellarmine's grave Argumentation upon Mr. Howe's ground, *Licet deo non sit posita Lex ab aliquo superiore Legislatore, tamen sua sapientia est ipsi Lex, &c. &c.* Though God be not under a Law given him by a superior Legislator, yet his own wisdom is a Law to him; and as Zuinglius himself teaches us, That what a Law is to us, that is Gods own nature to him. God is therefore no less bound, not to act repugnantly to his own wisdom and nature, than men are bound not to act repugnantly to the Law of God. Wherefore, if God should impel [Mr. Howe's phrase], men to these things, which are contrary to the Eternal Law, and to his own nature and wisdom, as to Adultery, his will were evil, because repugnant to the right rule of divine wisdom, and God should deny himself, which cannot be (as the Apostle says). Thus far Bellarmine, *ubi supra*.

Ans. Mr. Howe concludes, What relief is there in that dream, [of the supposed possibility of Gods making a reasonable creature with an innocent aversion to himself]. For what can be supposed more repugnant? or what more impertinent? If innocent, how were it punishable? A Law already made in the case, how can it be innocent? Let.

Reply. Mr. *Howe* leaves us wholly at a
 loss, who it is, that with this dream hath
 attempted to relieve a pious and sober mind,
 closely urged with the horror of so black a
 conception of God, that he does first irresist-
 ibly determine mens will to, and then punish
 them for the hatred of his blessed self, (as
 he tragically, but falsely represents our o-
 pinion), p. 40. I say falsely, for God does
 not punish that natural passion we call ha-
 tred, which himself, as first Cause, applies
 the second to the production of; nor does
 God determine the will to that natural
 passion, its elicitæ act, irresistibly, in his
 sense forcibly. But as *Austin* long ago, of
 Gods influence upon good actions; [to say
 we of bad] God acts *Omnipotenter pro te,*
suaviter pro me, *Omnipotently according to*
his own nature, but sweetly according to ours,
 (as shall be fully cleared in its place).
 If any particular person of our judgment
 in the main, shall propose an argument li-
 able to exception, I see not that we
 are obliged to defend it. But as Mr. *Howe*
 introduces it, it seems to be represented as
 a common extravagancy of the Predeter-
 minants, which I am sure it is not; nor
 does Mr. *Howe* labour under a surgedry
 of candour, in a bare presentation of this
 supposition, without its application to the
 Question. Both which, because Mr. *Howe* hath
 neglected,

neglected, I think not my self obliged to give the Reader an account of, but shall dismiss it without any adoe.

Arg. 2. The second pressing and important Argument of ours which Mr. H. repeats, *That God does predetermine sinful actions as actions, otherwise it were impossible for God to foreknow the sinful actions of men (many whereof he hath foretold) if their futurition were a meer contingency, and depended on the uncertain will of the subordinate agent, not determined by the supreme agent [God.]* Let. p. 35, 36.

Ans. To which Argument, this is the sum of his Answer, *That this supposed indetermination of the Will, in reference to wicked actions, is far from being capable of inferring anything more than that we are left ignorant of the way how he foreknows them, which is a small inconvenience, and manifest absurdity not to acknowledge the like in many cases, seeing God does many things, whereof the manner how he does them we can neither explicate nor understand.* Let. p. 47, 48.

Rep. 1. To which I reply, *That the way how God foreknows future contingencies, is in his own Decree, at least as to such which he hath decreed. For I cannot divine what can be opposed to this Proposition, That what God hath decreed he foreknows in his own Decree, (though it should be granted that*

that he foreknows them also antecedently to his own Decree in some manner, which we can neither explicate nor understand.) Taking that then for granted till it be denied, I think Mr. H. hath much overshot himself in denying universally our knowledg of the way how God foreknows future contingencies. For either he must exclude *the good actions*, which he grants God *predetermines* men to, Poſtic. p. 39. yea, and *all actions* of free agents to which he acknowledges God affords *immediate concurrence*, p. 28. from being *Contingencies*; (which himself as well as we, suppose in the whole controversie now agitated) Or deny that they fall under Gods Decree; (which is too absurd, because there's nothing more evident than that what God does in time, he decreed to do from Eternity) Or if he grants both, then it roundly follows, that God foreknew those acts of the Creatures which in time he did either predetermine to, or concur with; and such are all the actions of men disjunctively.

Rep. 2. We shall prove that God foreknows all future contingencies in his own Decree, and consequently the sinful actions of men.

1. By Scripture, Isa. 46. 9, 10, *I am God, and there is none like me, declaring the end from the beginning, and from ancient times the things that are not yet done, saying, my*
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counsel shall stand, and I will do all my pleasure. Upon which Scripture the Incomparable Calvin, (so I call him in compliance with the very Learned Andrews, (sometime Bishop of Winchester's admonition), that he was a man never to be named without the addition of some title of Honour) thus glosses, *Neque solum eius prescientiam hic commendat, &c.* i.e. Neither does God only here commend his own Prescience, but he affirms that he had testified by the Prophets what he had decreed. For there were no certainty, nor firmness in the Predictions, or Prophecies, unless the same God who foretells this or that thing would come to pass, had the event of things in his own hand. As to which words we may further observe:

1. *The form of the expression*: two Attributes are here applied by God to himself, Wisdom and Sovereignty or liberty of Will, and a common adjunct of both, Immutability, [or we may call it a common effect, the certainty of the event] that what God does wisely and freely determine or decree within himself, shall certainly come to pass.

2. *The extent of it*, that it refers to all those things which it was Gods peculiar certainly to foreknow, viz. all that should certainly come to pass. For as Judicious Calvin observes upon vers. 11. *Posteaquam Prophetia, &c.* After that the Prophet had spoken

of the Prescience of God, he accommodates the general expression he had used to his present purpose, to comfort the Jews in hopes of the return of their Captivity by Cyrus, &c.

3. The argument which is couched in them, to evince the certainty of Gods foreknowledge of what he did predict, viz. because the events predicted were the result of his Wisdom and Pleasure, or of his own wise Decrees.

And now to draw down this General to the particular in question, *Whether God foreknows sinful actions in his own Decree.* And for the proof of the affirmative I shall quote but that place, *Act. 4. 28,* compared with *Chap. 2. 23,* *For to do whatsoever thy hand and thy counsel determined, before to be done.* So the former place, *His being delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God, ye have taken and by wicked hands have crucified and slain.* So the latter; both speaking of the most wicked action that ever was done in the world, the putting the Lord of Life to death. To the former place the Learned Calvin says, *They who acknowledge only the Prescience of God, but do not confess that all things are managed by Gods will, are easily convinced by these words, that God hath foreordained that to be done which is done.* To the latter place the Learned Dr. Manton (now newly deceased, to the great grief of Pious

Pious & Learned Men) affords a notable gloss
 (which I especially recommend to Mr. H. for
 the friendship sake between the Doctor and
 him, in his Comment on *Jam. I. 13. p. 101.*
Many who grant Prescience, deny Preordination.
 [viz. the Decree, whereof Predetermination
 is the execution; So I understand him]
 lest they should make God the Author of Sin:
 but these fear where no fear is. The Scripture
 speaketh roundly, ascribing both to God, *Act. 2.*
23. [N.B.] Peter saith not only *τὴν προγνώσιν*,
 by the foreknowledg; but *τὴν προαποφασίν*,
 determinate counsel; which implieth a positive
 Decree. So far he: and for ought I know
 consonantly to the constant sense of Prote-
 stantism, till now of late that it grows
 weary of it self, if we may judg of its
 present humour by Mr. H. and Mr. B.) And
 by these sound Interpretations we may easi-
 ly judg, whether Mr. H's gloss upon *Act. 4.*
28. doth not corrupt the Text. Let us hear
 it, if our patience can bear such an exercise.
 That is, God foreseeing wicked hands would be
 prompt and ready for this tragick enterprise,
 his Sovereign power and wise counsel concu-
 rred with his foreknowledg, so only, and not
 with less latitude, to define or determine the
 bounds and limits of that malignity, than to
 let it proceed unto this execution, *Let. p. 29.*
 And soon after, Which purpose (viz.) of
 Christs to give himself to be a propitiation
 for

for the sins of men by dying, it was determined [by God] not to hinder prepared hands to execute in this way, p. 30. These words plainly imply a denial of Gods foreknowledg of the Death of Christ, as consequent to his Decree of that event, (which is sufficiently confirmed by the Scriptures now quoted against that denial) and they imply an affirmation of a foreknowledg of Christs Death antecedent to Gods Decree; and so make a confusion (where a distinction ought to be kept) between Gods foreknowledg of *possibles* and *futures*; or of what *may*, and of what *shall* come to pass; and run Mr. H. into this absurdity, to deny that any Decree passed upon the Death of Christ at all. For to what end should he pass a Decree, if he foreknew it would come to pass without it? I cannot conceive how Mr. H. can rid his hands of this absurdity, unless he shall affirm, the *passion*, but not the *action*, the death of Christ, but not their agency who put him to death was the object of Gods Decree. But then *Austin* will correct him by his gloss upon that Text, 1. Pet. 3. 17, *For it is better, if the will of God be so, that ye suffer for well-doing than for evil doing. Sancti affliguntur secundum Dei voluntatem, &c.* i.e. The Saints are afflicted according to the will of God, but they cannot suffer unless wicked men act. He that wills the *passion*,

sion, wills the action. Aug. in Enchir. c. 100.
 And the Philosopher will fall foul upon him
 with his maxim, *Actio & Passio sunt idem*
motus. i.e. *Action and Passion are one and*
the same motion. And differ but as the way
 from London to York; and from York to
 London; and but as the ascent and descent of
 the same Hill. And so it cannot be preten-
 ded with any colour, that the Decree of God
 includes the *Passion* of Christ, and excludes
 the *Jews and Gentiles* action about it. I will
 dismiss Mr. H. as to this Text without fur-
 ther exagitation, when I have but minded
 him of a passage of the acute Twisse, (who
 I presume; is one of those pious and learned
 men, to whom his reverence is not extinguished,
 notwithstanding the badness of their opinion
 about Predetermination, Post. p. 49.) *De*
ista Jesuitica, &c. Those Jesuitical dictates of
 the foreseen determination of the humane will
 before Gods Decree, are not the dictates disse-
 rentium Theologorum, sed somniantium. i.e. Of
 Divines disputing, but dreaming. Twiss. Vind.
 Gr. L. 2. p. 1. Digr. 2. c. 1. p. 31. And so I
 have cried you quittance, one dream for an-
 other. [Let. p. 42.]

2. By reason we shall demonstrate, that
 Gods foreknowledg of all future contingen-
 cies depend upon his Decree. And I shall
 chuse to borrow (because I have none of my
 own better) that of Dr. Twisse, which hath
 been

been esteemed irrefragable, says the Learned
Siramus, who yet opposes it, but not with
 strength enough to overthrow it; and hath
 done us the favour to reduce the whole
 process of the Argumentation into form. De
 Dei, &c. l. 3. c. 9. p. 628.

Arg. 1. What is future only by the Decree
 of God, that God necessarily foreknew by his
 Decree. But every future contingent is future
 only by the Decree of God. Ergo, every fu-
 ture contingent did God necessarily foreknow
 by his Decree.

2. The Minor proved. That which is fu-
 ture from Eternity, that is not future but by
 Gods Decree. But every future contingent is
 future from Eternity. Ergo, every future
 contingent is future only by the Decree of
 God.

3. The Major of the last Syllogism proved.
 That which from Eternity passed out of the con-
 dition of a thing possible, into the condition of a
 thing future, that is not future but by Gods
 Decree. But that which is future from Eter-
 nity did pass from Eternity out of the con-
 dition of a thing possible into the condition of
 a thing future. Ergo, That which is future
 from Eternity is not future but by Gods De-
 cree.

4. The Major of the last Syllogism pro-
 ved. That which from Eternity passed out of
 the condition of a thing possible into the con-
 dition

dition of a thing future, had for the cause of that passage the Decree of God, or no cause at all. But it cannot be said it had no cause at all. Ergo, only the Decree of God was the cause of that passage out of the condition of a thing possible into the condition of a thing future.

5. The Minor of the last Syllogism proved. Future contingents are either future in their own nature, or not future but by some cause determining their indifferent nature. But future contingents are not future in their own nature; else it would follow, that they should be always future, and never become present. For what agrees to any thing of its own nature, agrees to it inseparably. Ergo, future contingents must needs be future from some cause.

6. The Major of the same fourth Syllogism proved. If there be any cause why any thing passeth from Eternity out of the condition of a possible thing into the condition of a future, that cause must be either something without God, or in God; and if in God, either that cause shall be the essence of God, or the knowledge of God, or the will and decree of God. But the cause of any thing becoming of possible future, is neither any thing without God, nor the essence or the knowledge of God. Ergo, it is only the will or decree of God.

7. The Minor of the last Syllogism proved.

ed by parts. For first, nothing out of God could be the cause, because that passage (which they call futurition) was made from eternity, and therefore the cause thereof must be from eternity. But nothing is eternal besides God. Nor can the knowledge of God be the cause, for that severed from his will, doth rather suppose, than make things future. Moreover, if the Essence of God were the cause of this passage of things from possibility to futurity, it must either be said to be the cause as acting necessarily or freely. Not the former, for then all future things would fall out necessarily, and none would fall out contingently and freely. But God in things to be created, or created, hath done, nor doth any thing by necessity of nature, but freely. If the Essence of God be said to be the cause of the passage of things from possibility into futurity, as acting freely, this is to grant, that the will of God and the determination thereof is the cause why any contingent from eternity passeth out of the condition of an indifferent thing to be or not to be, into the condition of a thing future, or to determine the futurition of it. It remains therefore that the Decree of God, or the Decreeing will of God, be alone the cause of futurition (if you will admit the phrase) and of its effect. Thus far Dr. Twisse.

I desire the Reader to take notice, That though I have a great reverence for Dr.

Twisse, and do judge the proceſs of the above-cited Argument invincible as to the main; yet I am not clear in my apprehenſion, that the third Syllogiſm is in ſenſe different from the ſecond, (as *Serangius* objects againſt it with ſome probability.) Nor yet do I wholly diſlike *Serangius* his alteration of the terms of both the *Maiores* of the ſecond and third Syllogiſm, thus: *That which from eternity was poſſible ſo, as that it alſo had the condition of a thing future, its futurition is from the Decree of God. But every future contingent was from eternity poſſible ſo, as that it alſo had the condition of a thing future. Ergo, the futurition of every future contingent is from the Decree of God.* And then the fourth Syllogiſm will be the proof of the Major of the ſecond, (leaving out the third) and the words muſt be the ſame, and ſo the argument runs on without any further rub, unleſs perhaps the reaſon given in the fifth Syllogiſm, *Why contingent things are not future in their own nature,* becauſe then it would follow, that they ſhould be always future, and never become preſent.

For I confeſs ingenuouſly, that I cannot answer *Serangius* contrary conſequent from that antecedent; *That if future contingents were neceſſarily future, whether in their own nature, or in reſpect of any other cauſe, as the Decree of God, they muſt neceſſarily be preſent*

some time or other. For to be future is nothing else than that a thing should sometime be present. Strang. p. 630.

And these alterations (though I will not positively assert to be needful, as not having had time to examine *Strangius* thoroughly since he came to my hands, (which was long after Mr. H's Letter and Postscript came out,) yet I am the more willing to admit, that I may in part wipe off the aspersion Mr. H. casts upon many of us, who hold Predestination, *That whatsoever strength there may be in arguments and replys to and fro in this matter, that which hath too apparently had greatest actual efficacy with many, hath been the authority and name of this and that man of reputation. Let. p. 42.*

As to all the rest of the Doctor's Arguments, (if I be not a partial judg of my own abilities, an infirmity of lapsed humane nature, which I cannot challenge an exemption from,) I seem to my self able to answer *Strangius's* subtil evasions, and should willingly have done it, but that I doubt not but I shall meet with them in Mr. H's threatened Rejoinder, in which I expect Mr. H. should answer distinctly, by denial or distinction, to some Proposition in these Syllogisms; and then let him rhetoricate as he pleases in the amplification.

We have now dispatched the two Argu-

ments in the Letter, there remain three in the Postscript cited out of Mr. Gale's *Animadversions upon the Letter*; which, though modestly proposed by way of Question, will constringe our Learned Adversary.

Arg. 3. Whether there be any action of man on earth so good, which hath not some mixture of sin in it? And if God concur to the substrate matter of it as good, must he not necessarily concur to the substrate matter as sinful? for is not the substrate matter of the act, both as good and sinful the same? Postscript. P. 32.

Mr. H's Answ. 1. It seems then that God doth concur to the matter of an action as sinful; which is honestly acknowledged, since by his principles it cannot be denied: though most of his way mince the business, and say, the concurrence is only to the action which is sinful, not as sinful. Ibid. & pag. 33. So Mr. H.

Reply. Mr. H. misrepresents Mr. Gale's meaning: for it is not, that God concurs to the sinfulness of the action, but to the action; which though physically one individual action, yet is morally diversified in respect of its conformity and difformity to the Law of God: so that considering the natural action *in concreto*, with the good or evil adhering to it, it is no less true, that God concurs to the action that hath evil adhering

to it, than that he concurs to the action that hath good adhering to it. This premised, to the fault he finds with the distinction, I answer, that I doubt he must recur to it himself, when he is pressed, to know how Gods concurrence immediate to actions sinful will free him from the imputation of being the Author of Sin: yea, worse than so, I cannot imagine, but that as to those actions, which he calls in themselves sinful, he must own what he would fasten upon Mr. Gale, that God doth immediately concur to the matter of an action as sinful; for 'tis impossible to separate the malignity thereof from an intrinsically evil action, (as he tells us) Let. p. 33. [Of which hereafter.]

Mr. H's Answ. 2. This I am to consider as an argument for Gods Predeterminative concurrence to wicked actions. And thus it must be conceived, that if God concur by determinative influence to the imperfectly good actions of faith, love, &c. therefore to the acts of enmity against himself, cursing, idolatry, &c. To which (besides an unseemly scoff, is it not a mighty consequence?) Mr. H. answers divers things, & reasons for the denial of the consequence.

1. That it is infirm, because the actions in the antecedent are good, quoad substantiam, but these in the consequent are in the substance of them evil. Post. p. 33.

Reply 1. Mr. Gale doth not limit wicked

actions to those that are in the substance of them evil, but ampliates the term to all whatsoever: so that supposing the consequence were not good to such actions as Mr. H. instanceth in; yet it may be good to those actions that are evil, *quoad finem & circumstantias*, as to the end and circumstances. For instance, to be hospitable, or charitable out of vain-glory, to be reading the Scriptures at home, when we should attend upon publick worship, &c. and Mr. H. seems to yield it.

2. I am not yet convinced that there are any actions evil, *quoad substantiam*. And it is a wonder to me, that our Learned Antagonist should exact of us an implicite faith of that Position. It ill becomes his generosity so basely to beg the question. Let him prove that, and I will be his Profelyte as to antipredetermination of such actions. But because he neglecteth the duty he owes to his Hypothesis, I will perform mine to my own anon.

2. Mr. H. denies the consequence by an argument *a pari*; That we our selves can in a remoter kind concur to the actions of others, yet it doth not follow, that because we may afford our leading concurrence to actions imperfectly good, that therefore we may afford it to those that are downright evil; because to prayer, therefore to cursing and swearing, and

and then ruin men for the actions we have induced them unto. Ibid. & p. 34.

Repl. 1. In general 'tis unsafe arguing *a pari*, from the creature to God; that what the former may not do, neither may the latter. The creature is bound to hinder all the sin that he can; but if God were under such an obligation, there would not only have been so much sin as the world affords, but indeed none at all. And you your self discourse at large of the incongruity of an universal determinative influence to good actions; which yet would have made an admirable Metamorphosis of all the Sinners in the world into Saints; (at least if in those expressions you include, *infusion of grace*, which divine Predetermination of good actions presupposes, as I have proved before.)

2. If your arguing be forcible as to this instance, I see not, but you reflect as highly upon God by the *immediate concurrence* you grant to all actions of the Creatures, Post. p. 28. For will it not follow, that God affords men a leading concurrence to actions down-right evil, and then ruins them for those actions, which were as much his as theirs? I am too dull to imagine how you can extricate your self, but by eating your words, and distinguishing of concurrence, as you do of Predetermination; that God concurs to actions that are imperfectly good

good; but not to those that are down-right evil.

3. Mr. H's answer touches not the intendment of Mr. Gale's argument, which is to convince upon Mr. H's own assertion, that as God predetermines to actions imperfectly good; so by the like reason he may predetermine to actions that are perfectly evil. And the ground of the consequence is this, that if in actions imperfectly good, the evil and the good of the actions are so divided between the creature and God, that only the former is the Creatures, and the latter Gods; whilst yet the natural actions themselves are common to both, to God as the first, to the Creature as the second cause; why may not we infer that in actions perfectly evil, the action is common to God and the Creature, but the evil of it, the Creatures peculiar, and no more chargeable upon God, than in the other instance. And this I take for an irrefragable Argument, *ad hominem*, which if Mr. H. can satisfy, I am silenced.

4. It is an unaccountable inadvertency, (for to save his honour, so I will call it, rather than a slip of Judgment) to produce *cursing* and *swearing* for instances of actions down-right, or for the substance of them evil. I thought that *David's* frequent *cursing* of wicked men in the *Psalms*, and

Pauls

Pauls swearing; Before God I lye not, Gal. 1. 20. had not passed under so bad a character; but did rest assured, that (as the actions in themselves are capable, so in them) they were hallowed by their manner and end.

To what end Mr. *Howe* closes with this clause, *And then ruine men for the actions we have induced them to,* is not hard to conjecture (*viz.*) to insinuate, that our Doctrine represents God under the same character with the Devil, who induces men to sin, and then torments them for it. But what is said untruly (as well as Prophane-ly) of the Devil, is verified of our Doctrine, *That it is not so black as it is painted.* Mr. *Howe* indeed tells Mr. *Gale*, you'll say *God may rather,* and adds as his own sense, *But sure he can do so much less than you,* p. 34. This suggestion deserves a severer animadversion than I shall make upon it. In general, I say 'tis an odious slander. For we in no sense assert that God induces men to wicked actions, not morally, for we constantly affirm, that his commands, threats, are all against it; not Physically, for so he determines men to actions, not to the wickedness of them, nor does he ruine men for what he contributes by Pre-determination, or immediate concurrence to the Production of (*viz.*) the natural actions

actions he moves to and joins in.

Ansiv. 3. Mr. Howe denies the consequence from the evidence of two Scriptures compared, *Luk. 6. 9. Hos. 13. 6. p. 17* but (which is strange) hath not directed us how he infers from them the denial of Mr. Gale's consequence, or how they shew a difference between the warrantableness of Gods concurring to the substrate matter of an action as good, which tends to mans salvation and blessedness, and to the substrate matter of all their evil actions [which tend to their ruine and misery]; we must therefore guess at it as well as we can.

Reply. The former Scripture hath these words, *Is it lawful on the sabbath days to do good or to do evil, to save life or to destroy?* The latter these, *O Israel, thou hast destroyed thy self, but in me is thine help.* From the former Scripture, I presume, thus he argues: If it be unlawful to man to destroy life, then it is unlawful to God. But the antecedent is true, therefore the consequent. And he proves the consequence by the latter Scripture, by this Enthymeme, Gods word is to help man. *Ergo*, it is unlawful for him to destroy. And this, *vid.* that man destroys himself. *Ergo*, 'tis unlawful for God to destroy him. To which, I return,

1. That the antecedent or minor of the

first

first Syllogism, is not true universally, for
 for it is not unlawful for man to destroy
 life, *se defendendo*, i.e. in self-defence; but
 it must be limited to Homicide or mur-
 der, which notes not barely the act of
 destroying life, but involves with it a vi-
 ciousness, or that act done in cases prohibi-
 ted by the divine Law.

2. Suppose it were, yet I deny the con-
 sequence, and you cannot be any whit ea-
 sed or relieved by *the thin Sophistry, of on-
 ly a collusive ambiguity in the word [Lawful,]*
 which you must have recourse to. For sup-
 pose you take it in the antecedent strictly,
 and in the consequent analogically, in the
 former, for the *declared pleasure of a ruler*
to his Subject; in the latter, for an *habi-*
tual fixed principle and rule of acting after
one steady tenour, (which are both your
 own distinctions and explications of the
 word Law), *Let. p. 41.* yet the conse-
 quence is utterly false; because depending
 upon this false ground; that whatever man
 may not do in regard of Gods Law, God
 himself may not do, because of his own na-
 ture, or habitual fixed Principle and Rule
 of acting after one steady nature, (as you
 something oddly describe it). In this sense
 the subtil *Twiss* rejects *Syllogismus maximus*,
Quod nobis est Lex, Deo est ingenium &
Natura, &c. & *Let. p. 41.* & *Let. p. 41.* that

in Gods nature to himself. Though in another sense he admits it, That such obligation, as the divine Law lays upon us to do nothing repugnant to it, that Gods nature lays upon him to do nothing repugnant to it. Now then, though it be unlawful to man to kill in such cases as the Law exempts, yet it is not contrary to Gods nature to kill, and so not unlawful to him.

3. To the *Enthymeme*, we deny the connexion, that because in [or from] God is mans help; that therefore it is unlawful for him to destroy, for how then does God own himself the author of all evils of suffering, *Amos 3. 6, Shall there be evil in a City, and the Lord hath not done it?* And besides, we see not, such is the dimness of our sight, how the consequence would be proved thereby, were the connexion granted. The proofs subjoined hang together so loosely, that I cannot make sense of them, and therefore will dismiss them.

Your general drift I am aware of, that you deny Predestination to evil actions, though you concede it to good, because it seems more congruous to the divine goodness to con-
our (a term that you will still use, though improper enough, to signify that divine action, we call Predetermination, as hath been shewn once and again) to actions that

have good in them, rather than to these that have evil in them, because the one tends to the salvation, the other to the destruction of man. To which I answer: This Argument, if it hath any weight will bear as hard upon immediate concurrence, which you grant to all actions, and so to sinful, as upon Predetermination; and whatever answer will relieve you, will with the same hand ease us. I will pause a little with the Readers leave, and try my skill what answer I can excogitate for Mr. Howe, which will not be a common friend to us both, (as we have been hitherto one to another, and I hope shall remain notwithstanding this publick contest): I have thought out my thoughts, and they afford me but three Answers.

1. That immediate concurrence, as to sinful actions, divides between the action and the sinfulness; so that 'tis only the action as such, which is Gods and mans at once: the sinfulness of it is to be attributed to man only. And this distinction is an open friend to us, and to which therefore upon all fit occasions we pay our respects.

2. That if it be granted divine concurrence is as immediate to evil, as to good actions, (so as hath been explained); yet that does not necessitate or compel the will:

to

to any elicitè act, [i. e. inward acts of willing or nilling]: neither does Predetermination judg it self guilty, as to any such crime; for that does but put the creature upon that action, which is produced by Gods immediate concurrence with it. And but that it waits a fitter time to speak out her mind, she could say, That she conceives not how she can compel the will to any act, without compelling God himself: seeing one and the same act thereof, is as truly Gods as the creatures.

3. If immediate concurrence thinks her self disobliged to satisfie an inquisitive curiosity, as to the *modus* or manner how she joines with the creature in an action, to which sin does necessarily adhere, seeing the thing it self is plain, that so strict is the dependance of the creature upon the Creator, that it cannot act without Gods immediate concurrence: Predetermination claims the same priviledg upon the like ground, that the creature cannot exert its natural powers, till they be applied to action, nor determine it self to action, till it be determined; which determination cannot include a compulsion of the will (which is the main, if not the only controversy), for if the will act spontaneously, and from precedent deliberation, how is it forced? if it do not, how is it a will, i. e. a rational appetite? *Arg.*

Arg. 4. (which is Mr. Gale's second)
is, There is no action so sinful, that it hath
no some natural good as the substrate of it,
Postic. p. 36.

Ans. 1. To which Argument, proposed
 by way of Question, Mr. Howe answers,
True.

Reply. But then, if that be true, your
 former position, that *some actions are evil*
in the substance of them, p. 33. must needs
 be false. Let us but formalize the Oppo-
 sition thus: *some actions are so sinful that*
they have no natural good, as the substrate
matter of them; [which is the sense of the
 words just now quoted] *no actions are so*
sinful that they have not some natural good,
as the substrate matter of them; and it will
 appear, that they are propositions contra-
 dictory, and consequently, that they can-
 not both be true. They are two known
 Rules in Logick, *contradictio est oppositio in-*
ter universalem & particularem Enunciati-
onem [aut propositionem] And, *Harum al-*
terutra semper vera, & altera semper falsa.

Ans. 2. Mr. Howe presently finches,
 and Sophister-like, puts more into the con-
 cession, than was in the premises. And
 what must be inferr'd (says he) viz. from
 his own concession, That therefore God must
 by a determinative influence produce every
 such action (what ever reason there be against

Reply. Those words included in the *se-*
miquadrates are injuriously foisted in. For
 Mr. Gale's Argument entirely is thus, *If*
there be no action so sinful, that it hath no
some natural good as the substrate of it, then
God is the cause, (viz. by Predetermination
on) *of that natural good that is in every action*
on, sed verum prius, Ergo & Posterius. And
 indeed the Argument it self excludes any
 such addition. For there can be no reason
 against Gods production of what is good
 in any action, unless it be (what Mr. Gale
Howe objects) the accidental adherence
 of evil thereunto; which, if it be of any
 moment, militates as much against immediate
 concurrence, (as hath been shown before
 now). That passage of *Austins*, opposi-
 tely offers its service to us, as to the
 force of Mr. Gale's Argument, *Deus bene*
tantummodo causa est, &c. i. e. God is only
 the cause of good, therefore he is not the Au-
 thor of evil; because he is the Author of all
 things that are, which are so far good
 they are. 'Tis indeed Mr. Gale's Argument
 in other terms.

Ans. 3. Mr. *Howe* pretends, Mr. Gale
 might better argue from his premises, *The*
necessity of his producing every hour a new
world; in which, there would be a great deal
more of positive evil, and natural goodness
Postic. p. 36.

Reply

Reply. This is too great a scorn to be cast upon so learned a man, as Mr. Gale is well known to be. For there is no medium that can, with the least probability, be judged likely to be able to tack Mr. Gale's Antecedent, and Mr. Howes consequent together. To be sure, not that which nature suggests; for that is false and unworthy of a Philosopher, at least if these maxims be true, *substantia non recipit magis & minus; ens & bonum convertibile*; though 'tis easie to conceive there would be more positive Beings in number, upon Mr. Howes supposition, yet 'tis hard to conceive there could be a great deal more of positive entity, and so of natural goodness in the other world, than is already in the old.

Answer 4. The natural goodness that is in the Entity of an action, is no such invitation to the Holy God, by determinative influence to produce it, as that he should offer violence to his own nature, and stain the justice and honour of his government, by making it to be done, and then punish it, being *ibid.* p. 36.

Reply. 1. The natural goodness of an action, hath invitation enough in it to induce God to produce it, both because it is good, and because it cannot be done without him.

2. By

2. By Mr. *Howe's* own concession, something or other does induce God to produce it, by giving and conserving the powers, and immediate concurrence to the act of those powers.

3. It remains upon Mr. *Howe* to prove that the producing of an action by determinative influence, is more liable to those absurdities he names, than the producing it any other way, (except what *Durandus* pitches upon; which if he will also own, then I know what I have to rejoyn). In the interim, I am ashamed he should clothe his Reader with, *crambe bis cocta, coleworts twice sod*; I mean, an odious consequence imposed upon *predeterminative influence*, that it offers violence to Gods nature, and stains the justice and honour of his Government: which we shall deny, till he hath proved, that by it God makes an action to be done, *i.e.* in his sense necessitates it to be done, and then punishes it being done: which last clause is very absurd in its connexion, for it supposes a contradiction *viz.* that the action is naturally good and yet, that God punishes the natural goodness in it.

Arg. 5. (which is Mr. *Gale's* third and last). The denial of Predetermination, even of sinful actions as such, cuts off the most illustrious part of divine providence and government.

governing the lower world, *Postsc.* p. 33.

Ans. I am ashamed to answer it. Name any act of providence, I hereby deny, if you can, *ibid.* So Mr. Howe.

Reply. 1. This act of providence thereby you deny, which in words you own, to limit and moderate sinful actions, *Postsc.* p. 45. This will appear by considering what influence your mediate or immediate concurrence (for you do so fluctuate, that I know not which of the two you will abide by), can have upon this effect. The mediate can have none, for that is nothing else but a conservation of the being, with its powers and faculties, and so but abusively called concurrence or concourse; and so does but keep the powers indeterminate, not determinate, nor limit their acts: nor yet can immediate limit any action, because as such, it is neither before nor after the creatures action, but with it. The withdrawing of concourse immediate, may hinder, I grant, the creatures action: but whether God does ever withdraw it or no, *Strangius* L. 1. c. 11. p. 65. doubts, and so may you, perhaps, upon his ground. Let us, for the exemplification of this limitation, consider it, with respect to those things which it is conversant about.

1. As to the objects of its acts; as, that *Salomons* Adultery with *Dauids* wives, rather

ther than any other women. This is plain by comparing 2 Sam. 12. 11. with Chap. 16. 22. In the former place, the words are, Thus saith the Lord, Behold, I will raise up evil against thee out of thine own house; and I will take thy wives before thine eyes, and give them unto thy neighbour; and he shall lye with thy wives in the sight of the Sun. In the latter place the event answers the threat. And Absalom went in unto his Fathers Concubines in the sight of all Israel.

2. As to the time, when, or how long the sinful acts shall be exercised about their objects. When, Gen. 45. 5, God did send me before you to preserve life, says Joseph to his Brethren; whereas, they might not have sold him, till the famine came. How long; That is intimated in Psal. 125. 3. The rod of the wicked shall not rest upon the lot of the Righteous.

3. As to the event, or issue of the actions. That an oppressour shall impoverish, not utterly undo him he does oppress: that he who strikes his neighbour with an intent to kill him, shall yet but wound him.

4. As to the decree of the act, Psal. 76. 10, Surely the wrath of man shall praise thee; the remainder of wrath thou shalt restrain, *וְיִכָּחֵם*, *ginges*, *ligabis*; which I understand

derstand of binding up the faculty, that it put not forth its utmost force in the act issuing from it: as when a man is but in a pet, as we say, not outrageously angry. Thus God makes as great a difference between the same man and himself, as a Rider does when he uses a strait rein, or lays the bridle on his Horses neck.

2. The over-ruling and disposing of a sinful action to good, against the design and inclination of the sinful Agent, *Postsc.* p. 45. n. 10. is an act of Providence, which Mr *Howe* denies, in the denial of Predetermination. For *immediate concurrence* is all that Mr. *Howe* allows of; which, being but Gods action with the creature, and not existent before nor after it, cannot therefore direct the action to any end. And particularly in punishing one sin with another. As in the instance of *Absalom*; his Adultery with his Fathers Concubines, was a punishment of *Dauids* Adultery with *Uriah's* Wife. In this and such like instances, God is the Author, *ordinis in malo*, though not *mali*, (as the most learned Dr. *Field*, Dean of of Gloucester, expresses it, of the Church, p. 131, 132). *i. e.* God is the Author of the order of consequence, that one evil shall follow another, and have the reason of a punishment thereof; which how he can be, is no way explicable, but

by the Doctrine of *Predetermination* which, importing an application of the creature to action, and to one rather than another, and at one time rather than another, &c. (as hath been shown) gives an easie account, how God may dispose of sinful actions to good ends, and particularly to this, to be punishments of preceding sins.

And now, it is high time that we take a view of Mr. *Howe's* Arguments, for the negative of the Question hitherto discussed, for which we must return to his Letter again, where he states the *Thesis* he opposes, as importing an *irresistible predeterminative concurrence* to all actions of the creature, even to those that are in themselves most malignantly wicked, Let. p. 32.

Reply. Here are divers ambiguities in the terms (besides that of predeterminative concurrence, which hath been faulted already, as not very proper).

1. The term *irresistible*; which may either import, a *necessity of infallibility*, as to the event, or a *necessity of coercion* or compulsion. If he takes it in the former sense, 'tis altogether improperly. For *irresistible*, imports a relation of the action of the agent, to some resistance or counteraction of the patient; as when the water endeavours to put out the fire, which would

would lick it up ; or in free agents, when a man with all his strength resists him that by force would carry him away Prisoner. If he understands the term in the latter and proper sense, I understand not why he imposes the term upon our Thesis ; for we do not assert any compulsion in Predetermination of the will, nor can we conceive it possible in any case ; not if we should suppose *per impossibile*, a rational creature made under no Law at all ; for then as it would have a power, and also an inclination to use it, so there would be no need of any force to reduce it to act ; not supposing it (as it is) under a Law, would there be any need of compulsion, not as to good actions, because there are gracious habits to dispose the will to actions congenerous ; not as to evil actions, (no not if God did predetermine to them as such) for the will in regard of sinful habits is of it self inclined enough to any evil actions.

2. The *term*, in themselves most malignantly wicked. To which I say, that it may be understood in a double sense, either with respect, *to the different kind of Laws* that prohibit actions, thus ; Those actions are said to be in themselves evil which are a breach of the *Law of nature*, and so are opposed to those which are evil only by a *positive law* ; or else with reference *to the degrees of rectitude*

tude in one and the same Law; thus some actions are said to be in themselves evil, when they are evil in regard of their object, as that is opposed to the end and circumstances. Thus the hatred of God, and Adultery, are in themselves evil, because no end or circumstance can make them good; but giving Alms out of vain glory is not in it self evil, because changing the end, the action is good, that before was bad.

But Mr. *H.* understands the term in another sense, and overlooks the genuine signification of it; *viz.* thus, that *wickedness is of the essence of some actions.* This I collect from that clause, *Nothing is more apparently a simple and most strictly natural impossibility, than to separate the malignity thereof from an intrinsically evil action,* Let. p. 33. Now 'tis plain enough, if we take the hatred of God, which is Mr. *H.*'s instance of an action in it self evil, that the evil of that action is separable from it, for the same passion, if the Devil be the object of it, is good. And the evil of this action is as separable from it, as in actions that are evil, as to their circumstances. As to read the Scriptures, when it is our present duty to hearken to the Sermon. The reason is the same in both, the action of hatred is evil only in regard of the undue object, and the action of reading the Scriptures only in regard of the undue circum-

circumstance of time. And if Mr. *H.* understands *actions in themselves evil, of actions essentially evil*, let him enjoy his own satisfaction, but let him not impose it upon us, who look upon it as one of the greatest absurdities a learned man can be guilty of believing. To state the Question therefore aright (though we have done it before) we say, that we reject the term *irresistible*, as not being in the Question, but being a begging of the Question, because it supposes some force on Gods part the Agent, which the Creature as far as it can resists. And we disown the *distinction of actions*, which Mr. *H.* introduces into the Question, for we know of none that are *in themselves malignantly wicked*; that is (in his sense) *essentially evil*. But that which we assert is, That God does predetermine the Creature as well to the actions that are evil, as to those that are good. Let us now hear his Arguments against our Assertion.

Arg. 1. *If there be an irresistible determinative concurrence to all, and so to wicked actions of the Creature, then the matter of all Gods Laws in reference to all wicked actions was a simple and most strictly natural impossibility. But the Antecedent is, Therefore we must own the consequent, Let. p. 32.*

Ans. 1. In general, if we take his words simply as they sound, we see not but we may grant

grant the whole, with as little inconvenience to our assertion as to his. For the consequence will be the same, if some of his assertions be placed for an Antecedent in the room of ours, If God does certainly foreknow all, and so all wicked actions of the Creature, then for the Creature not to do those wicked actions, was *a simple and most strictly natural impossibility*. For 'tis as truly impossible that events should not be such as God foreknows they will be; as that men should yield obedience to the Laws of God, when God hinders them *thorough his own irresistible counteraction*, Mr. H's phrase p. 37. Again, we may argue thus, If there be an irresistible determinative concurrence to all good actions of the Creature, then the matter of all Gods Laws in reference to all good actions was *a simple and most strictly natural impossibility*; i.e. it is simply impossible, that good men should not do those good actions, exacted of them by the Law. As to this last, I cannot apprehend any reason why Predeterminative concurrence to evil actions should make the avoiding of them impossible; and the like concurrence to good actions should leave the neglect of them possible.

2. But because Mr. H. intends more by *Impossibility* than the Predeterminants can allow him, we shall borrow a little learning from

from the Schools for the explication of it. It is a Question in Metaphysicks, *An possibile & contingens a parte rei equipolleant*; i.e. Whether for a thing to be possible and contingent, are of the same signification or import? To which it is answered affirmatively, *Si possibile accipiatnr pro eo quod sese habet indifferenter ut sit*; i.e. If for a thing to be possible be taken for an indifferency to be or not to be. And by the like reason impossible and necessary must be terms equipollent, if impossible be taken for that which is not indifferent to be, and not to be; or, which as it is not, so nor can it be. 'Tis true indeed, that Impossible is contrary to Necessary; as Necessary is taken generally for that which cannot but be, and Impossible for that which cannot be: yet these two are equipollent, if the one be affirmed, the other denied; for that which is necessary to be, is impossible not to be; and that which is necessary not to be, is impossible to be; and on the other hand, That which is impossible to be, is necessary not to be; and that which is impossible not to be, is necessary to be. We must therefore make a little enquiry into the kinds of necessity, which as to things is either *simple*, or *compound*. The latter (for the former is irrelative to our business) agrees to things in their cohesion or connexion each with other; this

is divided into a *necessity of the consequent*, and of *consequence*, or *absolute*, and *relative*. The former is a connexion of those things which cannot be sever'd without a contradiction; i.e. destroying the nature of their subject. So justice to God, reason to man, agree so necessarily to their subjects, that if you deny either, you do in effect deny them to be what they are. The latter, a necessity whereby those things that are not in their own nature conjoined, are yet upon supposition of something antecedent conjoined for this or that time. Whence *Baronius* calls the former, a *necessity of nature*; the latter, an *accidental necessity*. Of this latter sort is this example, If Islanders will export Goods out of their own Country, they must make use of Ships. And from these modes of necessity it is easie to collect the modes of Impossibility, That something is said to be impossible, either *absolutely*, which involves a contradiction, as for a stone to be a man; or *respectively*, as if a man will fly that he should have wings. And here we may stop a while and observe how Mr. H. hath gratified his own unscholastick humour, in neglecting the strictness of Scholastick terms, to the overthrow of his own assertion. For I am much mistaken if it is not plain enough that Mr. H. confounds the distinction of *necessary* or *impossible*, into *absolute* and *relative*; and makes

makes the matter of Gods Laws, &c. upon supposition of Gods irresistible determination to wicked actions, to be an *impossibility* of both kinds, and so of neither. For if it be an impossibility only upon Hypothesis of Determinative influence, how is it a *simple and strictly natural impossibility*? If it be a *simple, &c. impossibility*, how is it an impossibility only upon an Hypothesis? [*viz.* that now mentioned.]

Way being thus made by explication of the Terms, to the antecedent or minor, I answer by denial, That the Determinative Influence to all wicked actions we assert, does infer any coercion on the Will.

Arg. If Determination of the Will imports Coaction, or is inconsistent with the freedom of the Will; then it is either from some general reason agreeing to all Determination, or from some special reason agreeing only to this Determination, *viz.* to sinful actions; but neither of these: *Ergo*, it does not import any such thing at all; no Determination of the Will in general does import Coaction, or destroy its liberty.

§ 1. Upon Mr. H's own concession of a *Predetermination of good actions*, Post. p. 39. which I presume he will not affirm to be *compulsory*; yet because I cannot see a reason why he should not, (as well as of evil actions) I will suppose him to acknowledg
it.

it. And then I would demand whether God compels men to the natural actions as such, or to them as morally good. Not to the natural actions as such, but to them there is no need of it, for the powers that produce them are apt and habile for any congenerous action, by Mr. H's confession, *Pass. p. 45*. Not to the actions as good, for the powers being renewed by Grace, (so far as they are such) need but an excitation, not a compulsion.

2. It appears from the general principle of Divines, *Libertas a coactione est essentialis voluntatis proprietas*; i.e. That liberty from force and compulsion is an essential property of the will. Which may be thus evinced. 1. By the nature of the wills liberty, that it is τὸ ἐκείνου φύσιν, *spontaneum intellectuale*; i.e. *spontaneum præiudice intellectus lumine vel iudicio*, as Strang. acknowledges, *De Vol. Dei*, p. 686. That is, an Intellectual spontaneity. A spontaneity in opposition to the acting of necessary agents, such as the Sun in shining; and Intellectual, to distinguish it from that spontaneity which agrees to brutes, or to mankind, who are acted by fancy, without previous judgment, as Infants, Fools, Mad-men, who whilest they remain such, are brutes in the shape of men and women.

2. It appears by the repugnancy of the terms

terms in conjunction. For the Will to be forced is but *invita aliquid velle*, i.e. to will any thing unwillingly; which were to will and not will the same object at the same time, which is an implicit contradiction.

2. 'Tis not from any peculiar reason agreeing to sinful actions. If there be any, Mr. H. would befriend the world to bring it to light. Which will appear,

1. Upon Mr. H's grounds, if Coaction be inseparable from compulsion, upon any special reason agreeing to one sort of actions, rather than another, it must be with respect to good actions, not to evil. For God determines the Will by irresistible grace, to such actions as by nature since the fall it is averse unto; and remains so in a degree after the blessed change it hath undergone: whereas the Will having a natural Bias to evil, [as it is not, so not.] does it need to be predetermined, i.e. forced, [if Mr. Howe be a faithful interpreter of the word.]

2. There are manifest indications of liberty in sinful actions, pregnant proofs that man hath not only *potentiam in se liberam*, but *liberum usum potentia*; i.e. a power in it self free, but as to them a free use of his power. An instance of his own hatred of God, will serve our turn. This act must be spontaneous, or 'tis not the act of an humane will,

which is an [intellectual] appetite; no, nor of a sensitive appetite, for to this last spontaneity is essential, and *intellectual* too: and so it is, for it proceeds from, and is guided by a precedent [though mistaken] judgment of the understanding, which represents God to him as a Tyrant, that abuses his authority by needless restraints upon mans natural inclinations. Suppose to unchastity with any woman whose skin and features attract his liking. *Joseph's* Brethrens hatred of him, was determined by God to the selling, rather than killing of him; yet as they acted spontaneously, so upon precedent consideration. Two Reasons determined their choice of the milder course of the two they had in view, *He is our Brother, and our Flesh, and what profit is it if we slay him, and conceal his blood?* Gen. 37. 26.

3. If there be any reason to infer Coaction from Predetermination, it must be the inconsistency of necessity on Gods part, and contingency on mans: Which if it be universally affirmed,

1. Then I know not how Mr. *Howe* will salve the objection against *immediate concurrence*, [which he seems to grant,] *that thereby the liberty of the will seems to be lost, both as to the exercise and specification of the act.* Unless as *Burgesdicinus* does, (whose solution offers it service, he being the first Metaphysick

lick Author that ever I read,) *That the concurrence of God takes not away the contingency of voluntary actions, because it does not precede the action of the second cause.* Burg. Met. l. 2. c. 11. n. 9. But then that reason (if assented to) will give a mortal wound to the Predestination (which certainly precedes them) of good actions, which Mr. H. acknowledges : or if he will loose the knot artificially, he must say that the concurrence of God is so accommodated to the nature and manner of the creatures acting, that notwithstanding it, natural causes act necessarily, and voluntary causes contingently, or freely ; and then the same answer will fit Predetermination of free agents to all their actions.

2. The denial of the consistency between liberty and necessity in general, will bear as hard upon (what we grant, and Mr. H. cannot deny) *actions in themselves good, as Amor Dei, the love of God ; as it can do upon (what we deny, and you assert) actions in themselves evil, as odium Dei, the hatred of God.* And harder, for the Will is but in part free to good actions, when-as 'tis wholly free, I mean disposed and inclined to evil actions. We are now the better prepared by way thus made, to answer Mr. H's proofs of his consequence. Which are,

1. *Not to do an action whereto the agent*

is determined by an infinite power is impossible, Let. p. 33. *Ergo*, not to do wicked actions, [for that's the sum of his consequent, in his Hyp. Syll. whereof this Enthymeme is a proof] to which the creature is determined is impossible.

Rep. 1. In general, that [supposing his Antecedent true, as 'tis in the sense before given] yet the impossibility he speaks of is not *a simple and most strictly natural impossibility*, which he before asserted; but an *impossibility relative*, to the determination of an infinite power, (as hath been proved.)

R. 2. That if he intends a *relative or conditional impossibility*, I grant his Enthymeme, for it hurts our Hypothesis no more than his, viz. *of determination to good actions*. For all determination does infer a necessity, that the thing determined should be, as it is determined to be; or an impossibility, that the thing determined should not be, as it is determined to be.

Rep. 3. If we must supply from the Hypoth. major, the term *irresistibly* to modify the *determination* he opposes, and we must understand by it *compulsion or force*, we again concede the whole without any disadvantage to us. And so we may rid our hands of it, as an ignoble begging of the Question, for that was incumbent on him

him to prove, not to take for granted, that our Predetermination imports a Co-action.

Mr. H's second Enthymeme is this, *To separate the malignity of an action intrinsically evil is impossible*, p. 33. Ergo, not to do such wicked actions to which the creature is determined, is impossible.

Rep. 1. Granting his Antecedent for Arguments sake, I cannot imagine how he will defend the *immediate concurrence of God to all the actions of his creatures*; and so to sinful actions, and so to those (if there be any such) as are in themselves evil, against the charge of involving God in the production of sinful actions, as such, seeing by Divine immediate concurrence the intrinsically evil action is as much Gods as mans action. *Baronius* and *Strangius* (who are as Heterodox as Mr. H.) do both confess, that it is very hard to shew how God may be freed from that charge, when-as he co-operates with the creature to every sinful action. *Bar. Met.* 98. D. 3. n. 72. *Strang. de Vol. Dei.* p. 344, 372. Though Mr. H. would lay the great difficulty and encumbrance infer'd upon our Religion, only upon Predeterminative concurrence to wicked actions. Yet, the Learned *Amesius*, a Predeterminant, tells us not without reason, *Deformitas moralis magna annexa videtur actui in exercitio, quam*

in applicatione ad agendum. Cont. Græv. p. 189. i.e. *Moral deformity seems more closely joined to action, than to application unto action.* For an object may be innocently presented to the eye, which may put a man upon action, viz. unchast desires.

Rep. 2. We will grant the Antecedent, *ex animo*, because it does implicate, that there should be any such action. 'Tis a received maxim, *Malum est in bono, tanquam in subjecto*, i.e. *Evil is in good, as in its subject.* And *Augustine's* saying is well known, and as well approved, *Ipsum quantum-cunque esse bonum est, quia summum esse bonum est.* De vera Rel. c. 34. i.e. *Being it self how inconsiderable soever is good, because the chiefest Being is good.*

R. 3. We deny that there cannot be a separation of an action from the evil of it. Of this separation there are many instances: supposing Usury lawful, (which I will not now dispute) I may lawfully take up money at use at Ten pounds per Cent. (if my necessity require it) when the Interest allowed by Law (which to break in matters of publick benefit is sinful) is but 6l. A Christian Prince may urge the great *Turk* to swear to Articles of Peace, though the former knows the latter will swear by his *Mahomet*. These are instances

ces of our concurrence to the actions of others in a remoter kind, [than God does concur to the actions of his creature] as Mr. H. speaks in another case, *Post. p. 33.* And by the like reason may God *Pre-determinatively concur* (as Mr. H. delights to speak, though not accurately) to an action that is evil, and yet not to the evil of it; which the Learned *Twisse* illustrates by divers pretty similitudes. *An Horseman* that puts on a lame horse to go, is the cause of his motion, not of his halting, that proceeds from some hurt in his leg, the instrument of motion. The Sun by his warmth makes the dunghill stink, of which stink that that warmth is not the cause appears, in that the very same influence draws forth a fragrant savour from a bed of Roses. That the dunghill smells is from the Suns drawing forth the vapour, but that it smells ill is from the condition of the matter. The upper-wheel of a Clock, though by its motion it draws along with it an under-wheel, that is irregular in its motion, yet it is not the cause of that irregularity. When a dexterous Penman writes upon sinking paper he makes [pothooks, as we say of children that begin to learn the art of writing] blots rather than letters, which yet is not his fault, but the Papers. *Twisse Vind. Gr. l. 2. p. 14, p. 26.*

Reply. 4. There must needs be a separation [and therefore 'tis possible to be] between actions, and the evil of them upon Mr. *Howe's* own Hypothesis (*viz.*) That God does predetermine to all good actions, which in the present state are but imperfectly good. Here he must distinguish between the efficiency of God and man, as to the same action, and ascribe the action and grace of it to God, and the evil that adheres to that action to man, unless he will ascribe all to God. *Absit blasphemia verbo!* If Mr. *Howe* can extricate himself, and not us with the same Answer; or rather, if he can excogitate any other Answer, than by this exlibilated distinction—*erit mihi magnus Apollo*, and without an Irony, *sapientum octavus*.

Reply. 2. To the connexion. I Answer, That it infolds a twofold contradiction.

1. For it supposes some actions to be intrinsically evil, and yet (by our Hypothesis) to be determined, i. e. compell'd, (if Mr. *Howe* may be admitted our Interpreter); whereas, that is not sin which is not spontaneous, neither is that spontaneous which is necessary, i. e. violent [or compell'd]. For violence is a Physical action upon the Patient; in which sort of actions virtue or vice hath no place: for the will is the principle of moral actions. So the learned *Cama-*

re de Scand. p. 98. [where note, that I presume *Camero* denies not original sin imputed, to be *suo modo*, i. e. in its kind voluntary, [and so truly sin], according to St. *Austins* sentiments, *nos omnes eramus illius homo*, i. e. we were all that one man, [Adam], and so sinned in him. This to prevent any misapprehension].

2. It supposes sin to have an efficient cause, whereas 'tis a known Rule in Divinity, *Peccatum quia tale & essentialiter est effectus moralis, & non habet causam Physicam*, i. e. Sin as such, and essentially is a moral effect, and hath no Physical cause.

Reply 3. Having given an Answer to Mr. *Howe's* Antecedent, and Connexion, we shall now proceed to raze the foundation of his Hypothesis, by proving, that there are no actions of free agents evil in themselves; or that no moral evil is positive, but only privative, (which latter are the common terms of Philosophers and Divines, in enquiring into the nature of moral evil). And I shall borrow one Argument, which will be instead of all, from the most learned Dr. *Barlow*, the now Renowned Bishop of *Lincoln*.

Arg. Every real and positive Being is from God the author and first cause of all Being. But moral evil [formally] taken, is not from God the author and first cause of all Being.
Ergo,

Ergo, moral evil [formally taken] is not a real and positive Being.

The *Minor* is evident, and acknowledged by the very Heathens, in the appellation of Optimus, the Best, which they apply to their Jupiter, together with Maximus the Greatest: [And will no doubt be owned by Mr. Howe; who, eo nomine, for that very reason, rejects Predestination of evil actions, because, in his apprehension, it makes God the author of moral evil].

The *Major*, let us hear the learned Bishop prove, [and the rather, because it will much confirm our first Argument for Predetermination of all actions as such].

Proof. Because it is impossible that there should be any finite and created Being, which does not depend, and hath its Being from an infinite and uncreated Being, [viz. God]; for it must needs be, if there be any Being not caused by God, that that Being be independent upon God as the first cause; and consequently, God shall not be the first cause in respect of that Being, whence follow many absurdities, &c. [whereof I shall only take the sum, as himself hath given it us, with an application to moral evil]. If moral evil, [i.e. any sin or breach of Divine Law], be a real Being; then, 1. God shall not be the cause of that Being; for of so deformed a birth, divine goodness cannot be the Parent.

rent. 2. This granted, it will follow, 1. That there is a secondary Being, and a Being by participation, [such as every finite Being is supposed to be]; which does not partake of [or receive its] being from the first Being. 2. That there is a finite Being independent upon God, both as to production and conservation. All which things we know, and believe are contrary, not only to Philosophy, but Divinity. Thus far the most acute Philosopher and Divine, *Exercit. metaph. 2a. de natura mali, ad calcem Scheib. met. p. 32, 33.*

Let us take notice of the instances of those sins, which are supposed to be evil in themselves, [or positive].

Obj. 1. Sins of commission which are evil, *ex genere & objecto*; (whereof two are specially insisted on: *Adams eating of the forbidden fruit*, and [by Mr. Howe] *the hatred of God*) are in themselves evil.

Ans. 1. In general. If all sins subsist in some actual motion of the soul, body, or both; and this motion abstractively considered, be the material part of every actual sin, and hath God for the prime cause, in whom we live, and move, and have our being; then no sin can be assigned, wherein this material part may not be found. So the Learned *Daveau*, sometime Bishop of Sarisbury, *Animadv. on Hoard*, p. 174, 175.

Ans. 2.

Answ. 2. As to the instances. The first, in eating the forbidden fruit, the material part of the sin, in regard of the Soul was the appetition thereof; in regard of the body, the mastication [chewing] and manducation [eating], and other bodily acts. Separate these from the formal part, which is *modus appetendi*, the manner of desiring, and containeth a repugnancy to Gods command, and God was the prime author thereof. The act of desiring and eating must of necessity be reduced to God, without whom there neither is nor can be any motion of body or soul: but the disorderly manner of desiring and eating contrary to the Law of God, this is reducible (as being a defect) only to the defective will of man, Davenant. *ibid.* p. 175.

As to the second instance, hatred of God; That the act terminated uppon that object, in *complexo*, is evil, and cannot be otherwise, we deny not; but then, that is true of acts and undue ends, as Hospitality out of vain-glory; of acts and undue circumstances, as walking in the Fields, when we should be at Church; as of acts and undue objects, whereof this is an instance. And so all sinful actions are evil, as to their substance, which Mr. Howe hath not affirmed. That hatred of God is not evil in it self, because the act invaried, the object but changed, that act which was evil,

is become morally good. So our Learned Bishop of Lincoln, again, *Exerc. met.* p. 41. which he illustrates and proves by the instance of *Adultery*, where the act being the same for the substance, is altered in its moral respect, by making the woman, with whom I committed *Adultery*, my wife, *Id. ibid.* Which instance of our Learned Bishop is plain, in the case of *David* and *Bathsheba*, whose society together was unlawful before, but lawful after their marriage. They that desire further satisfaction in this point, may do well to have recourse to a learned Discourse in our native Language, of Mr. *H. Hickman*, of the positivity of sin.

Obj. 2. One sin is the cause of another, as original sin inherent [as that stands opposed to original sin imputed] is the cause of actual sins; therefore sin is not merely privative.

Sol. The privation which is in the natural propension of the will to sin, [in which natural propension original sin consists], is not the real efficient of evil actions; but the will, in regard of that propension, is the real and true cause of evil actions. So *Baron. met.* qu. 5. n. 30. & 33.

Obj. 3. Our Divines do make a positive part in original sin.

Sol. Yet they hold sin to be only *Privative*. But then it will be demanded how
 * their

their assertions will agree together.

I Answer, In inherent sin there is said to be a positive and a negative Quality. This latter Divines call a want of original righteousness, or *not to be able to do good*. The former, they call a pravity of nature, or *to be able to do evil only*, which is called *Positive Logice*, because 'tis expressed affirmatively; whereas the latter is expressed negatively: so *Maccov. op. Post. p. 83*. [*r. fuse de hac re differentem* *Gilb. Voet. Disp. Theol. p. 1. p. 1084*]

Arg. 2. If God hath a predeterminative concurrence to the most wicked actions, it is then no way explicable how the influence and concurrence the holy God hath to the worst of actions, is to be distinguished from that which he affords to the best; wherein such inherently evil actions are less to be imputed to him who forbids them, than to the malicious Tempter, who prompts to them, or to the actor that doth them, or wherein not a great deal more? *Let. p. 32, 33*. which Argument Mr. Howe gives us more concisely afterward, That God hath as much influence and concurrence to the worst actions, as to the best; as much or more than the sinner or the Tempter, *Postic. p. 25*. [*viz. according to our Doctrine*].

Ans. 1. If our learned Adversary understands the antecedent, as we do whom he

he opposes, of the *materiale* of wicked actions, we grant his consequence : for we cannot yet see the inconvenience of owning, that there is an universal or indifferent influence upon the actions of free Agents, as such, abstracted from their morality. The actions of the understanding and will *Physically* considered, are neither holy nor sinful ; those denominations being taken from the relation of the actions to the Law prescribed, as a compliance with, or deviation from it : and therefore, *in linea Physica*, Gods influence and concurrence is the same, when they are the *substrate matter of moral evil, and moral good.*

2. If he intends the *formale*, or rather, the most wicked actions, *in concreto*, we disown the *antecedent* as none of ours, and complain of his disingenuity in pinning such an assertion upon our sleeve.

3. Yet however, for his satisfaction, I shall let him know, That (besides the influence upon good and bad actions in what degree soever, which we acknowledg common to both) there are divers differences of the influence we own for distinguishing of good actions from bad.

1. That as to good actions God does, *in genere physico*, re create those internal habits, which he did *concreate* in the state of innocency, with the several faculties, in which they were respectively seated, (as know-

knowledge in the understanding ; a rectitude of the will, consisting in a compliance with the last dictates of the practical understanding) ; that they might be [*actus primi*, or] principles of [the *actus secundi*, or] operations of the faculties, [in virtue of those habits], which [faculties] he influences to reduce them to act, by that influence which we call *Predetermination*. But as to evil actions, God infuses no evil, neither indeed can he (besides the repugnancy such an action would carry to his holiness) ; because, though sin be sometimes conceived by us, *per modum habitus positivi*, under the notion of a positive habit, yet it is not properly so, and so is not capable of production by that immediate efficiency, (which we call *infusion*), as hath been, in part, demonstrated before.

2. As to good actions God does in the Predetermination to them, so excite to the action, as that withal he adds new strength to the habits given, whence those acts immediately proceed ; which he does not neither as to evil actions.

3. We have a third difference from Mr. H's own concession : *The ordinary appointed way for the communication of this determinative influence is by our intervening consideration of the inducements which God represents to us in his Word, viz. The Precepts, Promises,*

Promises, and Comminations, which are the moral instruments of his Government. Postle. p. 40. The meaning of which words, is, that God is not only a *Physical*, but also a *moral cause* of good actions: whereas 'tis our sentiment, that God is only a *Physical cause* of the actions to which sin inheres, but not a *moral cause* of the sin adhering to them. And (if I do not too much trust my own judgment) this observation is not contemptible for the evincing of it; that the indifferency of the will to chuse or refuse the Object proposed by the understanding, is not so natural to the will, but that it may be inclined by an inherent quality to chuse or refuse one object rather than another.

As for the comparison which he makes between *God, the sinner and the Tempter*, (upon our grounds), and gives God the precedency of them both in his influence upon wicked actions, 'tis an *odious and horrible calumny*, not backed with any proof; as he intends it of such actions *in the concrete*, i. e. as including with the action the sinfulness of it too.

Reply. To it I reply, That a *short Horse* is soon curried. This slight objection is easily answered.

I. Either Mr. Howe means, as much *physical influence*, or *moral*. If the former, we say God and the sinner have both a *physical*

sical influence, upon the action that is evil, but the *Tempter* none at all; and that, as to the evil of it, their *physical influence* is alike, *i. e.* they have none at all; for sin not being a *physical effect*, cannot have a *physical cause*. If the latter, (besides that that influence is not in the Question), the *Sinner* and the *Tempter* have influence and concurrence to wicked actions, and *God* not at all: for neither by *Commands*, *Counsels*, *Threats*, nor *Promises*, does he induce men to sin.

2. Were it so; yet the *immediate concurrence*, which he acknowledges to all actions, and so to sinful actions; in conjunction with the notion he entertains with self-applause, of the *Inseparableness* of the evil of some actions from the actions themselves, makes himself obnoxious to the same charge of making *Gods* concurrence with sinful actions, to be as much or more than the *Sinners*, or the *Tempers*.

Arg. 3. Lastly, he charges the *Predestination* of sinful actions with *irreconcilableness* with *Gods* wisdom and sincerity, &c. *Postsc.* p. 23. by which, &c. I presume he intends, in his *Counsels*, *Exhortations*, and what-ever means he uses to prevent them, (which are the expressions he uses in the Title-Page of his Letter, in reference to *Prescience*).

Reply.

Reply. As to both of these perfections of God, I am not aware of any thing well said by Mr. *Howe*, for the reconcilableness of Gods Prescience with them, which may not by a just proportion be applied to Gods Predetermination. For the evincing whereof, we will cast his Discourse into Paragraphs.

1. To speak particularly of Gods wisdom.

1. *That there should be a direct and explicit contradiction between fore-knowing and dehorting, we may at first sight perceive the terms cannot admit, Lec. p. 51.*

Reply. The same may be said of Predetermining, and dehorting, though not simply as to the terms, yet as to the things signified by them; for the elicit acts of the will, being the Object of Predetermination, [contested for], we may at first sight perceive it cannot be compell'd, and so as to the event, infers but a necessity of infallibility, as to the sinners doing what he is dehorted from, (which also Prescience does).

2. Mr. *Howe* goes on, *Let it be supposed only, that the blessed God hath belonging to his nature universal Prescience, we will surely, upon that supposition, acknowledge it to belong to him as a perfection. And were it reasonable to affirm that by a perfection he is disabled for Government? or wer*

it a good consequence, he foreknows all things, he is therefore unfit to govern the world? Let. p. 54.

Reply. And why may not we as well argue thus, Let it be but supposed only, that universal Predetermination belongs to Gods nature, we will upon that supposition acknowledge it a perfection. And were it reasonable to affirm, that by a perfection [that he not only conserves the powers of his creatures, but reduces them to act] he is disabled for government; or were it a good consequence, He is the first cause, [not only of all beings], but of all actions as such, therefore he is unfit to govern the world? And I will add; nay surely, but the more fit in the present state of mankind, [not to intermeddle now with Angels], because all the actions of men, being either in whole or in part sinful, he would have nothing to govern, if he had not the government of all their actions; and govern them he could not, nor limit them, nor turn them to good, if he did not Predetermine them, (as hath been, I trust, clearly evinced).

3. Would the supposition of such foreknowledge in God make that case to be man's duty, which had otherwise been so? Let. p. 54. for what influence can foreknowledge have to alter or affect any way, either the nature of

the thing foreknown, or the Temper of the person that shall do it, any more than the present knowledg of the same thing now in doing?

P. 55.

Reply. And can Predetermination make that cease to be mans duty, which otherwise had been so? seeing that it alters not the nature of the thing: [the will of man], nor the Temper of the person [Predetermin'd]; but as it finds the will free, so it leaves it; and as it finds the person disposed by habitual inclinations, so works upon him; which is confirmed, by that grave observation of his, which we embrace as our cordial friend, and confederate. *It were very unreasonable to imagine, that God cannot in any case, extraordinarily oversway the inclinations, and determine the will of such a creature, as over whom Gods general course of Government is by moral instruments, [viz. Man], in a way agreeable enough to its nature, Let. p. 141.* Only we extend it further, That supposing, (what hath been before proved), that Predetermination includes a Perfection, God can in all cases determine the will, without forcing it to actions to which it hath a renitency; for that were to alter the nature of the will, and the temper of the person whose will it is. And I add, what influence can fore-determining have to alter the nature of the thing, or

person fore-determined, more than immediate concurrence to the same action, of the same person, now in doing?

4. But if what was otherwise mans duty, be still his duty, what can make it unfit, that it be made known and declared to him to be so? and how is that otherwise to be done, than by these disputed means? yea, (for this is the case), what can make it less fit, than that God should quit the right of his Government to his revolted creatures, upon no other reason, than only that he foresees they have a mind to invade it? Let. p. 56.

Reply. All this Argumentation fits our Predetermination as well as Prescience, (wherein Mr. *Howe* and we agree): what can make it unfit that God should acquaint man with his duty, by proper means, seeing Predetermination supposes such a foreknowledge (as Mr. *Howe* supposes, antecedent to Gods decree) of the creatures having a mind to invade Gods right of Government, if put under such and such circumstances; or rather, (because we understand not any foreknowledge, but of Possibility, things possible, not Futurorum, of things future, antecedent to Gods decree) seeing Gods determination of the Creatures will to invade his right, without which he could not will so to do, leaves the Creatures will as truly free from Co-action, as

if it exerted all its elicit acts, only by a power derived from God, and preserved apt and habile for action.

4. But it may now be said, All this reasoning, (says Mr. Howe), tends but to establish this assertion; that notwithstanding God did foreknow mans sin, it is however necessary he forewarn him of it: but it answers no objection difficulty, (viz.) How reasonably any such means are used for an unattainable end: as it manifests the end, mans obedience cannot be attained, when it is foreknown he will not obey, Let. p. 57.

To this difficulty Mr. Howe answers, That there is this noble and important end, which Gods Edicts aim at, (viz.) the Dignity and Decorum of his Government it self. And that he may be found in every thing to have done as became him, and most worthy of himself. And what could be more so, than to testify his aversion to whatsoever is unholy, his love of righteousness, and complacency to be imitated herein, together with his propension to make them happy, who do imitate him, p. 61. [I take here but the sum of Mr. Howe's words, because they contain nothing controversial].

Reply. Whether this Discourse affords us any new consideration or no, yet we can claim the benefit of it in the fullest extent of it to Prescience, as to Predetermination also.

2. As to Gods sincerity, the difficulty may still urge, how it can stand with sincerity, whereas that end also which fails, [viz. mans obedient compliance with Gods Declarations of his will, p. 60.] seems to have been most directly intended, &c. p. 65. To which Mr. Howe answers.

1. That the publick Declarations of the Divine will do attain that very end in ~~part~~ part, and as to many, and are the successful means of obtaining it, p. 66.

Reply. And so they do upon our Hypothesis, who acknowledg God first infuses gracious habits into some, and then determines the powers in which these habits reside, to congenerous actions; which yet excludes not the use of Gods Edicts, as means of educing those actions: which because they are vital and free passing from the Will, upon a comparison made in the Understanding between the Goodness of the Objects proposed to it, do require a moral cause, whereby the Agent may both understand the Object, and by Arguments be induced to imbrace it, (as the Learned Parker observes, *Thef. de Trad. Pecc. ad vitam Th. 27.*)

2. Nor was it necessary that those who would obey should be sever'd from the rest, and be dealt withal apart, &c. p. 67.

Rep. This we also assent heartily unto.

3. Nor was it necessary, that effectual
care

care should be taken that they should actually reach all, and be applied to every individual person, p. 67.

Rep. Here is a strange loss we are put to for an Antecedent to the Relative, *They*. The only one that I can meet with is, *publick declarations of the Divine will touching mans duty*, p. 66. and *Divine Edicts*, p. 67. and I cannot fathom the reason of the denial of their necessity to their two ends by himself assigned, *Mans Obedience, and the Decorum of the Divine Government*; at least if he means by them the Gospel, (as I gather from his after-discourse.) If he intends by his Relative *They*, *determinative influences to holy actions, to which the nature of man is now viciously inclined*, (as he elsewhere speaks, *Post. p. 40, & 35, compar'd*) I cannot find that *Antecedent* in his whole Discourse foregoing: yet the following passages might give a suspicious person some ground to pitch upon this latter for Mr. *H*'s meaning. *And thus [by messengers running from Nation to Nation, some to communicate, others to inquire after the tydings of the Gospel] how easily, and even naturally would the Gospel soon have spread it self through the world?* Let. p. 69. I confess that term *naturally* will not down with me: for I have always seen cause to own Dr. *Sibb's* weighty observation, *in his Souls Conflict, That though there*

there are seeds of the Law, yet there are none of the Gospel in man by nature. But upon second thoughts to do Mr. H. all the right I can, out of love to his person, and the truth, I find, That the *They* refers to the Divine Edicts of the Gospel, which he supposes not needful to be immediately by the Ministry; but the transmission of it from those that have heard it published by them, may suffice to others. But to what end he expatiates upon this I do not know; though I do what ill use Mr. John Goodwin in his *Pagans debt and dowry*, makes of this very notion. *Sed meliora spero.*

4. Nor was it incongruous that God should provide by some extraordinary means that his gracious tenders might not finally be rejected by all. Let. p. 74.

Rep. Yet it seems not of such absolute necessity (as I always conceived it to be) if by the dispensations of God towards the whole community of mankind, [whereof he reckons instances, and addes] they might understand God to have favourable propensions towards them, and that though they have offended him, he is not their implacable enemy; and might by his goodness be led to repentance. Let. p. 75, 77, compar'd. For thus Mr. John Goodwin argues against the absolute necessity of the Gospel strictly taken. And in Phrases so near, that my fancy is ready

ready to abuse me with a mistake, that not *J. H.* but *J. G.* is now discoursing. *Rom. 2. 4.* The long-suffering of God and goodness of God are said to lead men to Repentance, because they testify according to a rational and clear interpretation, a willingness and readiness in God to receive all such into grace and favour with himself, who shall unfeignedly repent of their sins. So *Mr. Goodwin*, *Pagans debt and dowry*, pag. 13. And he adds, There is no other consideration but this, (at least none without this) in respect whereof the patience and bountifulness of God can be said to lead, i.e. to perswade or invite to repentance. There is no motive or perswasive, whereof sinners are capable unto repentance, without hope of pardon upon repentance. *Id. Ib.* And concludes you see it clear from the Scripture, that even Heathen men, and those that want the History of the Gospel have yet a sufficiency of means whereby to believe, and so to prevent the wrath and indignation which is to come. *Mr. Goodwin*, *Ib. p. 14.* I must profess I am none of *Mr. J. G.*'s Proselytes, who ever be; nor was *Mr. Obadiah Howe*, a most worthy person, and kinsman of our Learned Antagonist, who hath learnedly and largely confuted him, in a Tract intituled significantly, *The Pagan Preacher silenced*, out of whom I shall transcribe his Answer to *Mr. J. G.*'s Explication of *Rom.*

2. 4. of Heathens. This second Chapter relates to the Jews, whom he reprehends because by their Law they would condemn the Gentiles as sinners, when they committed the same things. But that the patience [and goodness of God] afforded to the Jews was without the word, I think Mr. G. will not affirm, which is the cause why the Apostle concludes the Jews under a great inexcusability, because the ministry of the word superadded to the light of nature, became not efficacious to restrain them from sin; and from this very Argument he argues against the Jews, v. 17, 18. still supposing that these persons enjoying the patience of God, v. 4. had the letter of the Gospel. So far Mr. Ob. Howe, p. 52.

5. As to those with whom Gods Methods succeed not well, it is to be considered, that he doth not apply himself to every (or to any person) immediately, and severally, after some such tenour of speech as this; I know thee to be a profligate, hopeless wretch, and that thou wilt finally disregard whatsoever I say to thee, and consequently perish, and become miserable. But however (though I foresee most certainly thou wilt not, yet I entreat thee to hear and obey, and live. Let. p. 79. And afterwards, What is endeavoured for the reducement of such—is by substituted Ministers, that know no more of the event than they do themselves, p. 81.

Rep.

Rep. Nor doth God apply himself to sinners in such a tenour of speech with reference to Predetermination of those natural actions; which because such need a cause acting efficiently for the production of them: though he knows (without special grace which to them he affords not) a moral obliquity will adhere to them. And it is as true, that what God does for the redemption of them is by Ministers, who know as little who are Predetermined to good, and who to sinful actions, as the Saints or Sinners so Predetermined.

Having discoursed thus more laxely, Mr. *H.* proceeds to a more strict disquisition of two things.

1. *What may be alledged out of Gods word in reference to them that finally perish in their wickedness, which can be thought not consistent with sincerity to have inserted, upon the supposed foresight of so dismal an issue? Let. p. 82. And he instances in Gods professing to will the salvation of all, 1 Tim. 2. 4. Not to desire the death of him that dieth, Ezek. 18. 32; Yea, and professeth himself grieved that any perish, Psalm 81. 12, 13. Ib.*

In answer to which Scripture in general (besides many things said well): he says, *That which Gods declarations do amount unto is, &c. That if they neglect to attend to these*

these external discoveries of the word, &c. they are not to expect he should over-power them by a strong hand, and save them against the continual disinclination of their own wills. p. 89, 90.

Reply. I am not able to make sense of the last words: For I understand not what overcoming by a strong hand (in a sinners case) God can make use of, that leaves the will under disinclination to salvation; And they seem to be repugnant to another Clause referring to the same persons: *that they cannot promise themselves such power shall be used with them, as shall finally overcome their averse disaffected hearts.* p. 90.

2. *Mr. H.* adds, *Whatsoever extraordinary Acts, God may do upon some to make them willing.* p. 90.

Reply. I am not well satisfied (because I am not ignorant of the *Arminians* apprehension about *Pauls* Conversion) that *Mr. H.* calls those Acts by which God makes some men willing, *extraordinary*: for though they are *supernatural*, yet they are *ordinary* to all that are willing. It seems to imply, that some are made willing by *ordinary* acts, and others by *extraordinary*: And so it is an ill-sounding word.

3. *Mr. H.* at last gives us the import of the above-cited Scripture, That they really signify the obedience and blessedness of

of those his Creatures that are capable thereof, to be more pleasing and agreeable to his nature and will, than that they should disobey and perish, which is the utmost can be meant [particularly] by those words, God will have all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth. p. 93, 94.

Reply. As these words sound they do not gratify my ear: For I cannot understand, that the Connexion of Disobedience and Destruction, should not be as agreeable to Gods Will and Nature, as the Connexion of Obedience and Salvation. I take the import of 2 Cor. 2. 15, We [Apostles] are unto God a sweet savour of Christ, in them that are saved, and in them that perish: that God takes pleasure in the perishing of unbelievers, as well as in the saving of believers.

2. Yet in sano sensu, I admit them as the most learned and pious Davenant, sometime Bishop of Salisbury, explains the matter: When God commandeth any thing which is good, he unfeignedly liketh and loveth such actions, and can do no other; his own natural goodness, and holiness terminating, Voluntatem divinæ complacentiæ [i. e. the will of divine Complacence] unto all holy actions by whomsoever performed, Animadv. on Hoard, p. 350. And Gods meaning when he offereth any grace to men, is, that they should perform such actions whereunto such grace

grace conduceth; and his meaning when he promiseth glory to any man if he believeth and perseveres, is truly to perform it if he do so. *Id.* pag. 353. And not to sever the learned Bishops sentiments: To Mr. *Heards* notion [the same with Mr. *Howes*], that mercy is more natural and pleasing to God than Vindicative Justice, which is his strange work; He doth not willingly afflict, &c. [for which are quoted, *Mich.* 7. 18. *Isa.* 28. 21. *Lam.* 3. 13]. The Bishop replies, That is said to be natural and pleasing to God, which comes originally from himself, and is not an act depending upon the misdeserts of the Creature. p. 206. As for Vindicative Justice it may be called a strange work, because it is *opus occasionatum* [i. e. a work occasioned] by mans transgression. p. 287.

And once more to cite this eminent Divine; The absolute liberty and supreme dominion, which God hath in the preparing, or not preparing of effectual grace, wherein the absolute decrees of Election and non-Election do shew themselves, is a thing as natural and pleasing to God as his mercy. p. 287.

4. Mr. *H.* asserts, That God doth so far really will the salvation of all, as not to omit the doing that which may effect it, if they be not neglectful of themselves, but not so as to effect it by that extraordinary exertion of power, which he thinketh fit so employ upon some others. *Let.* p. 105. Reply.

Reply. This must be mixed with a grain of salt: If this omission of Gods refer only to the use of means for effecting mens salvation, we grant, that *in genere medium*, God is not wanting to them that live under the Gospel-dispensations. And in this sense God representing himself under the similitude of an Husbandman, truly says of Israel, *What could have been done more to my Vineyard, than I have not done in it?* Isa. 5. 4. But if Mr. H. intends (as the words seem to sound) that salvation may be obtained by the use of means, without that exertion of power (which he calls *extraordinary*) whereby that end is obtained in some, I cannot take such an assertion upon his bare word. I have been taught from my Childhood (and see no cause to suspect the credulity of that age abused to draw me into a misbelief) that such an exertion of power, as whereby God raised Christ from the dead, is universally necessary to make the means of salvation effectual to their end.

5. Mr. H. professes his dislike of the common distinction of *Voluntas beneficii* & *signi*, in this present case. [viz. to explain how God wills the salvation of all, and yet only of some] under which such as contend, that those that have much faith, have only more of the same, come off a good winning.

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than expressed by it a bad one. p. 106.

Reply: And whoever coined it (which I take it was *Hugo de S. Victore*) few of our Divines but have used it, that have dealt in any Controversie which gave an occasion for it. And why should Mr. H. charge them with a concealment of a good meaning, which they have so often discovered? If Mr. H. only dislikes the terms, I should not contend with him, for I can give him their sense in others from the learned *Davenant*; The will of God termed *voluntas simplicis complacentiæ*, i. e. the will of simple complacency [which is the same with *vol. signi*] and that which is termed *voluntas absoluta* or *efficax* i. e. an absolute or efficacious will [which is the same with *vol. beneplaciti*] may well stand together. God wills that all men believe and be saved with the will of complacency; God wills and decrees to permit that some continue in unbelief, and be not saved but perish, with the Absolute will. The former will in effect is but a conditional will; As if the Apostle had said, God will have all men to be saved, if all men shall believe in Christ; and to believe in Christ is an act so well pleasing and so agreeable unto Gods will, that wheresoever it is found it shall be rewarded. But notwithstanding the extent of this will as to all men, there is in God an absolute will permitting some to continue in their unbelief.

and so perish, Dav. ag. Hoard, p. 220.

But it must be observed, that whereas the most learned Bishop seems to attribute a *Conditional will to God* above; he afterwards explains himself, *Meer or purely conditional Decrees* agree not with the perfection of the Divine Nature. The speeches therefore cited out of Scripture [*He that believes shall be saved, &c.*] do not imply a Conditional Will in God suspended for any moment of time; and then *post purificatam conditionem*, i. e. after the Condition performed] becoming an absolute and effectual will, &c. But these conditional Decrees are grounded on some absolute revealed Decree of God, to the Performance whereof he hath tied himself. For example, it is an absolute Decree of the Divine Will published in the Gospel, *that whosoever believeth, &c. shall be saved.* From hence is derived that mixt conditional Decree; *If Cain, Judas, or any other believe, they shall be saved.* Now such mixt conditional Decrees carry no contradiction to the absolute, &c. who seeth not these Propositions may well stand together? I will that if *Judas* repent and believe, he shall have remission and salvation. I will not to give to *Judas* the gift of repentance, of faith and of eternal life, *Id.* p. 223, 226, 227. I have said enough to obviate M. H's exagitation of the terms *Kol*

signi & beneplaciti, which are not worth the trouble of transcribing.

6. But M. H. adds, *And of these faults the application of the distinction of Gods secret and revealed Will unto this case, though it be useful in many, is as guilty.* Let. p. 108.

Rep. 1. As to this I say (as the aforesaid Bishop Davenant of M. Hoard); Mr. H. should first have rightly set it down, and then have tried his strength in confuting it, and I shall add his explication of it: We say that there is in God a true will revealed in the Gospel of saving all men that shall believe; and a true will liking, embracing, rewarding faith, holiness, perseverance in all men whomsoever without distinction of persons: And this is the Will call'd *Voluntas simplicis complacentie* [or *signi*] which neither decreeth nor determineth any thing infallibly concerning the being or not being of such good acts in this or that singular person. This Will we know, and therefore we call it his *revealed will*. There is also in God a secret will of bringing some men to faith, perseverance, and the Kingdom of heaven, and of not bringing others to any of these: this Will we know not, and therefore we call it, the *secret Will*, *Dav. ag. Hoard*, p. 221: only 'tis to be noted, that when the Reverend Bishop says, *This secret will of God we know not*, it must be understood

derstood, with reference to the particular persons whom God intends to work faith, &c. in; for we know in general, that there are some persons whom God will be thus good unto. I add this to prevent a Cavil, which may seem very acute to them that use it: If God's will of good pleasure [or absolute will] be secret, how come we to know it? or if it be revealed, how is it secret? *And then the members of the distinction are confounded* (as Mr. H. objects, p. 107.) who should have done well to have told us, in what cases it is useful (though not in the present case). For I dare offer my self to disprove the use of it in any case, upon the same grounds that Mr. H. can the use of it in this.

Rep. 2. And yet when Mr. H. hath so solemnly declared his dislike of our distinction, he owns it himself, but in other words, which are the explication of our terms: *And whereas it may be thought to follow hence, that hereby we ascribe to God a liableness to frustration and disappointment, that is without pretence: The resolve of the Divine will in this matter* [viz. the holiness and salvation of all men] *being not concerning the event what man shall do, but concerning his duty what he should, and concerning the connexion between his duty and his happiness,* Let. p. 112.

Now to leave Mr. *H.* inexcusable for the impertinency of his exception against our Distinction; let us see how Dr. *Twisse* (a man that much used this distinction, and therefore blamed by Mr. *H.*) explains it. There is no contradiction, says he, between these two wills Divine: For *Voluntas signi* is improperly called a Will, for it signifies only mans duty, or what he should do, as what will be pleasing to God if it be done. But *Voluntas beneplaciti* is properly and simply a will, (*viz.* whereby is decreed whatsoever shall come to pass, by Gods either efficiency, or permission) *Twisse Vind. Gr. l. 1. p. 1. §. 12. p. 140.* It is evident to any intelligent Collator, that M. *H.*'s, and Dr. *Twisse*'s sense is the same, and so Mr. *H.* hath blamed himself in blaming *Twisse*.

7. And if it should be insisted, that in asserting God to will what by his Laws he hath made become mans duty, even where it is not done, we shall herein ascribe to him, at least an ineffectual and imperfect will, as that which doth not bring to pass the thing willed: It is answer'd, that Imperfection were with no pretence imputable to the Divine will, meerly for not effecting everything whereto it may have a real propension, *Let. p. 115, 116.*

Reply. We had need tread warily here, for our way is strewed with Daggers, I mean, with terms repugnant to each other.

1. If God be understood but to *will mans duty, not the event* [his obedience to it] there's no colour for the Objection, that the will of God is ineffectual ; for it is effectual (when declared) to make mans duty what it pleases.

2. If by *willing mans duty*, he means *the event* [the performance of it], then is there an Objection indeed, but without solution, and not capable of any.

3. Take it how you will, there's no answer to the Objection. For this is, *That Gods will is ineffectual if that come not to pass which is willed* ; and that is, *That God hath no will at all of that which comes not to pass* [which yet the Objection supposes] for what else is the meaning of a real *Propension*, which differs as much from willing as an habit from an act, or as the power of seeing when my eyes are shut, from my actual seeing when they are open ?

8. Nor could any course have been taken that was fit in himself, and more agreeable to sincerity [viz. than counsels, and exhortations, and whatsoever means God uses to prevent mens sins]. There are only two ways to be thought on besides, either that God should wholly have forbore to make overtures to man in common, or that he should efficaciously have overpower'd all into a compliance with them. And there is little doubt, but upon sober con-

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sideration both of these will be judged altogether unfit, Let. p. 121.

Reply: As to the former of these two ways, I have nothing to oppose; As to the latter, there is a great deal of doubt; and Mr. H. implies so much when he says, it is less obvious.

9. Mr. Howe proceeds to shew the unfitness of Gods efficacious overpowering all men into a compliance with his Overtures to them, because of two congruities in the course taken for the Government of the World.

1. That it be steady and uniform; not interrupted by frequent, extraordinary and anomalous actions.

2. That he use a royal Liberty, of stepping out of his usual course sometimes, as he sees meet, p. 131, 132; and adds, If we apply them to the affairs of Grace, there is something correspondent. That ordinarily [grace] be sought and expected, in the use of ordinary means. And that sometimes its Sovereignty shew it self in preventive exertions; and in working so Heroically, as none have beforehand, in the neglect of its ordinary methods, any reason to expect, p. 138.

Repl. 1. This Answer is not fitted to the Question. The Question is, Whether it be fitting for God efficaciously to overpower all men into a compliance with the overtures he makes

to them in common? The Answer is, It is not fit for God to overpower men, without making any overtures to them at all: or to alter the terms and keep the sense, the Question is, Whether it be fitting, that God should give all men special grace, in the use of means? And the Answer is, It is not fitting, that God should give all men special grace, without the use of means. An admirable incogitancy in a man of parts! If the Question had been about the fitness of Gods converting all men (whom he thinks meet to convert) as he did *Saul*, by a voice from Heaven; the Answer had been a-kin to the Question: (though even *Saul* was not converted without means, but without ordinary means).

2. I am at a loss for a Reason, why it should be unfit for God efficaciously to overpower all men into a compliance with the means (supposing what I hope Mr. H. will not deny, I am sure will never be able to disprove; that no man will ever comply with the means, that is not overpow'd thereunto) unless it be this, that it is unfit for God to bestow grace, and salvation upon all men (which would be a very hard saying).

Reply. 2. As to his second *Thesis*, if it be (as 'tis pretended) an Answer to the Question proposed. I Answer, That though it

it be fitting enough for God to *use a Royal liberty* in giving grace to some, and not to others; yet I understand not that the suspension of his Liberty, and binding up himself to give grace to all, had been any way unfit. We poor Mortals, I am certain, are very unfit to judge what is fit or unfit for God to do. We may rest satisfied that God does nothing but what becomes him: but we shall intermeddle in things too high for us, if we pass sentence, that for God to do otherwise in many instances than he hath done, would unbecome him. God hath permitted the whole race of mankind to turn Rebels to his Sovereign Majesty, and but some part of the Angelical nature. This became him to do, because he hath done it. But suppose he had prevented the Rebellion of all his rational Creatures; or mans, and not the Angels; or the Angels, and not mans; or permitted the Rebellion of all the Angels, (as he hath of all mankind); or restored the Angels, and left man in his own ruins: would Mr. *Howe* adventure to say, that upon sober consideration any of these ways would have been judged altogether unfit for God to have taken?

10. Mr. *Howe* proceeds, and acquaints us, that it were incongruous that a whole order of Intelligent creatures should be moved only by inward

inward impulses : — And that the faculties, whereby men are capable of moral Government, should be rendered to this purpose [viz. the Improvement of means] *useless and vain*. And that they should be tempted to expect to be constantly managed as mere Machines, that know not their own use, Let. pag. 142, 143.

Reply. Either this Harangue is impertinent; or it borders as near upon *Arminianism* as Scotland does upon England. If Mr. H's meaning be, that it is incongruous for God to overpower men, that neglect the means [as his words p. 142, imply] whereas the Question he undertook to Answer is, *Whether it be congruous for God to overpower all (as he does some) that use the means*, then his Discourse is besides the business; or if he would insinuate, that the course which God takes with some [though not with all] in overpowering them, is to manage them as Machines, and render their natural faculties vain and useless; This is *Arminius's* Charge upon the Protestant Doctrines of the irresistible operation of special grace.

To draw now to a close, after too long a Discourse, (that I may not tire my Reader) I shall only request him, that he would duly consider, that of Mr. H's Principles there are these desperate consequences, (which I have so much charity as to believe he does
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not see, and (so) nor own,) That God is justled out of his proper place; I mean, of being the first cause of all the Creatures actions, and the Creature put in his stead, as being represented able to use its powers, as it pleases. That one great Perfection of the Divine Nature, viz. Foreknowledg of future Contingencies, is separated from it, by denying the only true ground of such Foreknowledg, the Divine Decrees. And hence, the Providence of God in governing the actions of his Creatures is left in great danger of falling, because a Superstructure raised without a foundation. For how can God govern those actions which depend not immediately upon him in their production; nor are foreknown in his *Eternal Decree*, wherein lies the model of all he intends to exercise his Government upon, *in time*?

In sum, his Doctrine opens a wide door for Atheism, and deserves as sharp a censure as one gave of *Epicurus's* denial of Providence, *Verbis Deum posuit, re sustulit*; i.e. *He acknowledged God in words, but denied him in deed*. For as all Arguments proving any of the *Divine Attributes*, do prove a *God*, because those terms are essentially convertible: so those Arguments which deny any *Divine Attributes*, do also deny a *God* upon the same ground.

I shall give the Reader no further trouble

trouble but what (if he be conscientious) he will willingly give himself of examining what he hath read, and judging according to the evidence of *Truth*; for which in this momentous Controversie, and not for *victory* I have entred into this publick contest with my ancient and learned Friend, Mr. *Howe*, which I take to be sufficiently warranted by that passage of holy Writ: *But when Peter was come to Antioch I withstood him to the face, because he was to be blamed*, Gal. 2. 11. Whence it may be duly collected, that the reverence or estimation of any mans person ought not to hinder a publick reproof, when he is guilty of a publick scandal.

F I N I S.
